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ABSTRACT
Awareness and voice are explored through case studies of Zadie Smith’s White Teeth. Karl
Marx’s unaware and voiceless lumpenproletariat, Gayatri Spivak’s possibly aware but voiceless
subaltern, and Saul Williams’ losers are compared. Williams’ loser may or may not have access
to and engage in re-vision and re-representation, since the loser may exist at any point along the
continuum of awareness and voice. Capitalism and the superstructure make everyone a loser.
Thus, there is an inherent solidarity among losers, and it is this solidarity that may bring re-vision
and re-representation to those who are unaware and voiceless. Unlike the lumpenproletariat and
the subaltern who fall under modernist metanarratives, the loser has a postmodern subjectivity
whereby the individual’s inherent access to discourse gives her/him access to power. Carl Jung’s
and Julia Kristeva’s theories of individuation and self-realization are used to further expound
upon the individual’s relationship to discourse, and, by extension, to re-vision and rerepresentation. To conclude, the solidarity of the loser and the loser’s inherent access to
discourse and power may facilitate awareness and voice, revision and re-representation, for self
and others.

vi

INTRODUCTION
i SPEAK A NEW LANGUAGE / as is ALWAYS THE FIRST SIGN of a NEW AGE.
(Williams, Said the Shotgun to the Head 5-6)
Re-vision and Re-representation: An Exploration of Awareness and Voice in Marxism,
Postcolonialism, Postmodernism, and Psychoanalytic Theory was begun as an exploration of
subjectivity and power. This text is about the hope that lies in discourse, re-vision, and rerepresentation. Chapter 1 focuses on subjectivity as formed through capitalism and the
superstructure. I begin by delineating the “lumpenproletariat,” the “subaltern,” and the “loser”
and their relationship to awareness and voice, according to Karl Marx’s, Gayatri Spivak’s, and
Saul Williams’ theories respectively. Chapter 2 narrows in on the individual to look at the
individual’s relationships to self and others. I utilize Rebecca Raby’s discussion of modern metanarratives vs. postmodern narratives in “What is Resistance?”; Carl Jung’s and Julia Kristeva’s
theories of psychoanalysis, self-realization, and individuation; and Saul Williams’ theories.
These theorists lay the groundwork for my discussion of subjectivity, discourse, re-vision and rerepresentation. Throughout both chapters, I use Zadie Smith’s characters in White Teeth as case
studies.
The first chapter, “The Lumpenproletariat, the Subaltern, and the Loser: An Examination
of Awareness and Voice,” discusses subjectivity and capitalism. According to Marx, the
lumpenproletariat lacks both awareness and a voice (Marx, “Eighteenth” 45). Spivak argues that
the subaltern may be aware but is voiceless (Spivak 104). Williams claims that the loser may
exist with any degree of awareness and voice or lack thereof (“Saul Williams Returns” par. 7).
Williams’ loser at first seems like an ambiguous term. Yet, the loser is ambiguous because (s)he
is ubiquitous, i.e., we are all losers in conjunction to capitalism and its superstructure (par. 12). It
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is this ambiguity and ubiquity that allows the loser to exist in solidarity with other losers, as well
as with the subaltern and the lumpenproletariat. Using these theories as premises, this paper
argues that solidarity is realized through re-revision and re-representation, which is founded
upon awareness and voice and which brings about discourse and power. Re-vision/re-visioning1
denotes the process of self-discovery and re-creation of self whereby the individual takes back
their authority through discourse and re-imagines the present, past, and future. Through
reclamation of one’s own identity, the individual has the power to remake their culture as well.
Re-visioning is a tricky process, one of picking and choosing, of trial and error, a place of
uncertainty and possibility. Anyone who re-visions has to make their home, albeit a troubled
home, in the in-betweens. Re-representation2 is speaking for self and others through discourse
that re-visions reality. As an example, one means of doing this is through rebelling with
“thought, words, music, a collage of evolutionary shifts that might explain how one generation
goes from being colored to black, and another that infuses ‘nigger’ with love” (Williams, US(a)
19). Solidarity compels the aware and vocal loser to speak to and for the lumpenproletariat, the
subaltern, and other losers with the hope of making re-vision and re-representation viral.
The second chapter, “Awareness and Voice Beyond Capitalism: A Psychoanalytic and
Dialectic Perspective,” explores metanarratives, narratives, subjectivity, discourse, re-vision, and
re-representation. I theorize that the metanarratives of identity and power-relations presented by
Marx and Spivak for the lumpenproletariat and subaltern are not accurate representations of
subjectivity and power. Rather, I propose that a postmodern view of subjectivity should be used.
Discourse, according to postmodernist thought, is the means by which the subject is formed,
comes to understand his/her self, and exerts power (Raby 162). Every individual has access to
discourse and, as such, has access to power (162). While Williams’ loser does exhibit a
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postmodern subjectivity, Williams’ theories are not explicated sufficiently to provide a
foundation for an exploration of the relationship between the self and re-vision and rerepresentation. In other words, Williams talks about changing one’s perspective and discourse,
but does not explain the process of changing one’s reality, i.e., how the self is formed through
discourse, myths, symbols, etc. That being the case, Carl Jung’s and Julia Kristeva’s
psychoanalysis, self-realization, and individuation serve as a framework to discuss how dialect
and power intersect with the individual and society. Jung describes the process as follows: “To
do this he must first return to the fundamental facts of his own being, irrespective of all authority
and tradition, and allow himself to become conscious of his distinctiveness” (Jung, On the
Nature of the Psyche 59). The individual must move past the mass symbols propagated by
society and form her/his own symbols and myths. I use the words from the characters from White
Teeth to show how discourse also exists in the in-betweens of a discourse that nurtures re-vision
and re-representation and a discourse that pathologizes. It is worthy of note that the path to
individuation and re-vision is not linear; some of the characters progress and then regress. That
undulation is to be expected given that individuation is an ongoing remaking of the “I.” Some
wholly accept the mass symbols, others reject the mass symbols but never create their own
symbols, and others create their own symbols and stories. Discourse and symbol/myth/story
making is where hope lies. It is the means to re-vision and re-representation.
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Notes
1. The term re-vision can be found in other texts but not with the same meaning. For
instance, Rudnytsky defines re-vision as “taking a fresh look at something, whether
prompted by [an event],…or as the result of the discovery of new primary sources or
major additions to the scholarly literature…or simply as a consequence of the way that
one’s understanding of a phenomenon changes with one’s own intellectual and emotional
development” (xxii). Another example is Bloom’s use of revisioning as in the act of
reconceptualizing one’s precursor’s poems in order to make “a mental space…to fill
[with their] own vision” (66). My form of re-vision was inspired by psychoanalysis
(discovering oneself through individuation which brings multiple subjectivities of the self
into harmony), feminism (under the umbrella term of Feminism, there being different
forms of subjectivity, intersectionality, feminism and feminist rhetoric, all which are
constantly challenging the status quo both within the movements and outside of the
movements to recreate and rename the self and the relationship between the self and
society) and posthumanism (recreating the self and society through reconceptualizing the
past, present, and future). In this text, re-vision specifically denotes self-actualization
through challenging and re-writing the symbols and concepts that constitute the self and
society. In this text, re-vision is a process inextricably linked to awareness and voice, to
discourse and power.

2. Re-representation is “representation as ‘speaking for’” and creating “art or philosophy”
(Spivak 70, 72). The way in which I use re-representation in this paper aligns with the
second definition, which Spivak further explains as “a representative consciousness (one
re-representing reality adequately)” (70-71).
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CHAPTER 1
THE LUMPENPROLETARIAT, THE SUBALTERN, AND THE LOSER:
AN EXAMINATION OF AWARENESS AND VOICE
We cannot forget / Our past because / You will remember it / For us.
(Williams, The Dead Emcee Scrolls 151)
Capitalism and its superstructure make fools of us all. Through this realization (i.e.,
awareness of the oppression of capitalism and awareness of the solidarity created through the
ubiquity of oppression), the lumpenproletariat, the subaltern, and the fool may become aware
and find their voices. This paper will begin with exploring the multiple meanings of
lumpenproletariat, subaltern, and loser. Awareness, re-vision, voice, and re-representation will
then be defined and explored through the theoretical lenses of Karl Marx’s, Gayatri Spivak’s,
and Saul Williams’ works. In order to gain a better understanding of these abstruse theories, I
will use Zadie Smith’s characters in White Teeth as case studies. The “good for nothing[s]” (8);
“losers” (76); “fools” (77); “Hippies, Flakes, Freaks, and Funky Folk” (32); the crazy (148);
thugs self tagged with corporate logos (193); pious, Muslim “juvenile delinquent[s]” (369);
“half-caste,” self-deprecating African Americans (228); “stranger[s] in a strange land” (351); the
angry who have neither “face [nor] voice in the country” (194); as well as the half-witted
philosopher cooks (433); the pseudo-heroes who now wait tables one-handed (92); the paper
folders who make none of their own decisions (441); and even the “middle class mafia” (358) of
White Teeth are representative of Karl Marx’s oblivious lumpenproletariat, Gayatri Spivak’s
voiceless subaltern, and Saul Williams’ dynamic loser, all of whom are oppressed by capitalism
and its superstructure. Finally, I will use the analysis of Smith’s characters to demonstrate that it
is possible for the loser, through the processes of re-visioning and representation, to bring
awareness to the lumpenproletariat and give voice to the subaltern.
5

Ambiguity of Class, Lumpenproletariat, Subaltern, and Loser
As the section title suggests, class, lumpenproletariat, subaltern, and loser will be
defined. This lengthy review of the terms is necessary for an understanding of the complexities
of the theories and for the later use of case studies from White Teeth. Lumpenproletariat,
subaltern, and loser are distinct but overlapping terms in terms of class, awareness, and voice.
Because of their dual or multiple meanings, they appear to be identical in ways. The
lumpenproletariat, the subaltern, and losers can but do not necessarily share unawareness and
voicelessness. What distinguishes the lumpenproletariat and the subaltern from the unaware and
voiceless loser is the possibility of awareness and voice. Whereas the loser may develop
awareness and a voice, the lumpenproletariat, as conceived by Marx, will never be aware and the
subaltern, as conceived by Spivak, will never have a voice. An additional distinction is that loser
is a term connoting solidarity, since all losers, regardless of their state of awareness and voice,
are oppressed by capitalism and the superstructure.
The meaning of class, the standard means of labeling individuals as lumpenproletariats
or subalterns or losers within a capitalistic society, is two-fold and contradictory. Class,
according to Spivak’s interpretation of Marx, has the common association of a distinct economic
position and lifestyle, but it also has the denotation of community, without which a group of
people in an economic group is not truly a class (Spivak 72). This definition of class leaves one
wondering if the lumpenproletariat, the subaltern, and the loser – really more of a motley group
of individuals than a community – constitute a class. Economically and socially, the
lumpenproletariat, the subaltern, and the loser belong to a class, a minority and severely
marginalized class. At the same time, the lumpenproletariat and the subaltern have been
traditionally denied a class, because the lumpenproletariat and the subaltern can be found in
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multiple economic classes and because class necessitates awareness and a voice to express
community. By extension, the unaware and voiceless loser would also be denied a class. Yet, the
solidarity expressed by the aware and vocal loser gives the unaware and voiceless loser and, by
extension, the lumpenproletariat and the subaltern a class. The lumpenproletariat, the subaltern,
and the loser exist in an in-between state of having a class and being without class.
Likewise, the meaning of lumpenproletariat is two-fold and contradictory, indicating the
unemployed as well as those without class consciousness. The lumpenproletariat are not a
particular class but are the “passively rotting mass,” the “refuse, offal, and wreck of all classes”
(Marx, “Eighteenth” 45). Included in the lumpenproletariat are not only those who do not labor
(“beggars,” “vagabonds,” “pickpockets,” “discharged convicts,” “runaway galley slaves,” and
“dismissed soldiers”) but also the petty bourgeois (“keepers of disorderly houses” and “literati”)
and capitalists (“adventures-seeking dregs of the bourgeoisie”) (Marx, “Eighteenth” 45). In
contrast to the lumpenproletariat are the proletariat1, the term used by Marx to indicate those
who labor and/or those who have attained class consciousness. Undoubtedly because of the dual
meanings of lumpenproletariat and proletariat, Marx does not mention the proletariat in relation
to the lumpenproletariat. However, there are many who would be labeled lumpenproletariat, in
the sense of the unemployed, who develop class consciousness and are proletariat in
consciousness; inversely, there are those who would be labeled proletariat, in the sense of the
employed, who have not and perhaps never will develop class consciousness and, as such,
mentally belong to the lumpenproletariat2. Marx also labels the lumpenproletariat “the
dangerous class” (Marx, “Manifesto” 215). Perhaps this is because the lumpenproletariat are
generally associated with criminals, but the association may also be because it is the
lumpenproletariat of each class, even among the proletariat, who uphold the ideologies of the
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power structure, thus working against their own and their peers’ enlightenment and liberation. It
is in this latter sense that lumpenproletariat is used in this essay and will be demonstrated
through the case studies from White Teeth. Again, the term lumpenproletariat is ambiguous. An
individual can exist in an in-between state of simultaneously being and not being a
lumpenproletariat.
As with the lumpenproletariat, the subaltern is a perplexity, existing in a state of class
and classlessness and voice and voicelessness. Spivak describes the subaltern as “the margins
(one can just as well say the silent, silenced center) of the circuit marked out by the epistemic
violence, men and women among the illiterate peasantry, the tribals, the lowest strata of the
urban subproletariat” (Spivak 78). The subaltern is most commonly associated with the
subproletariat, the poorest of the proletariat, such as those found among Marx’s description of
the unemployed lumpenproletariat but also any severely marginalized group. Like
lumpenproletariat with its dual meaning, subaltern also refers to those who have no access to
representation, no matter the class. Spivak writes:
Reporting on, or better still, participating in, antisexist work among women of color or
women in class oppression in the First World or the Third World is undeniably on the
agenda. We should also welcome all the information retrieval in these silenced areas that
is taking place in anthropology, political science, history and sociology. Yet the
assumption and construction of a consciousness or subject sustains such work and will, in
the long run, cohere with the work of imperialist subject-constitution, mingling epistemic
violence with the advancement of learning and civilization. And the subaltern woman
will be as mute as ever. (Spivak 90)
As such, though the subaltern may be aware and literally have a voice, the subaltern is rendered
effectively voiceless (Spivak 104). The subaltern is voiceless with a voice, certainly a
paradoxical and in-between state.
The loser has multiple meanings and subjectivities. The dictionary definition of loser
varies from Williams’ definition of loser. Williams’ loser can also be broken down into multiple
8

subjectivities that exist on continuums of awareness and voice. There is the aware and vocal
loser, the unaware and voiceless loser, and the aware but voiceless loser. Furthermore, these
subjectivities are nested within the overarching oppression of capitalism which gives a shared
meaning to the different losers.
The loser has a dual sense as well when comparing the common use of loser to Williams’
meaning(s) of loser. Loser can refer simply to someone who has lost or who suffers loss, but,
when an individual is called a loser, it most often refers to someone who is a failure as a result of
their own incompetence (Loser). It is a word used to dismiss, silence, and reject.
Alternatively, Williams reclaims loser, like “nigga” has been reclaimed: “The lowest
rungs, the disenfranchised, the people who don’t matter, who are brutalized or displaced, and the
way you take that back and say, ‘Yeah, I’m a nigga, I’m the baddest motherfucker you will ever
meet’” (“Saul Williams Returns” par. 7). Instead of depicting the loser as a failure without any
reference to the effect of society, Williams sees the loser as the individual who still aspires
despite and against the oppression of society. Williams elaborates that he thinks of losers as
“those who identify with the disenfranchised and don’t want to consider themselves free until
everyone is free” (par. 7). Williams’ loser, unlike the lumpenproletariat, is aware of the
oppression of society and, unlike the subaltern, speaks against society’s oppression, and, unlike
the proletariat, feels a sense of solidarity with the oppressed, no matter their class, no matter if
they are beggars or literati or bourgeoisie. Contrary to the way that loser is used in common
parlance, Williams’ loser is lauded as an astute, capable individual who belongs in and actively
works to build a sense of community. Considering its dual meaning, loser is a re-claimed word,
an ambiguous shapeshifting word, having both negative and positive connotations.
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In addition to the loser as a reclaimed subjectivity as just discussed, the loser may also be
unaware and voiceless, thus giving Williams’ own definition another meaning. Williams thinks
of the Christian concept of the sinner when thinking about the loser (“Saul Williams Returns”
par. 7). Everyone, according to Christian ideology, is a sinner and a loser from birth. Another of
Williams’ assertions helps explain this: “We’re all prisoners to gender roles, to all the ideologies,
[including religious ideologies], that we’re born into and perpetuate before we even start thinking
for ourselves and questioning societal authority that we’ve given power” (par. 12). As the quote
entails, many losers are unconscious of the power structure and their role in aiding it. The quote
also indicates that everyone starts out a loser, an unaware and voiceless loser. The ubiquity of the
oppression means that the aware and articulate loser feels a sense of solidarity with the unaware
and voiceless loser. Thus, there are multiple subjectivities nested within the concept of the loser.
Another example of Williams’ unaware and voiceless loser is the consumerist loser, who
is similar to the lumpenproletariat and the subaltern. The most common type of loser discussed
and depicted by Williams is the loser whose only goal is consumerism, anything to ward off
vulnerability and to increase bravado, having forgotten about their past and present subjugation
(The Dead Emcee Scrolls 142). Williams talks of Caucasians trying to be black, presumably to
increase bravado, and African Americans “tryin to shop to feel free,” perhaps also to increase
bravado or maybe to feel the temporary high gained from the addiction of consumerism (168).
Critiquing the consumerist loser and their mentality that places the maximation of wealth i.e.,
capitalism, as central, Williams asks, “How much will it cost to buy you out of the mentality that
originally bought you?” (143). This quote indicates that those in capitalist cultures are
unconsciously investing in the power structure which has and continues to oppress them, to
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silence them. In this way, they are like the lumpenproletariat, being unaware of their own buying
into the oppressive structure, and the subaltern, being voiceless as a result of being oblivious.
Yet another type of loser is the aware but voiceless loser. Williams writes of the indie
rock concept angst driven loser who falls short of expectation, who doesn’t belong (par. 7). This
type of individual is conscious of society’s concept of and effect on their self, but it is
questionable whether the individual is just whining about the oppression or if they are using their
voice for revolution. If the loser is just whining, the loser is essentially voiceless, a voiceless
similar to that of the subaltern.
Altogether, losers may exist at any point along the continuum of awareness, from a
consumerist loser who buys into the myth of sin, to the aware but voiceless angst driven loser, to
the enlightened and vocal loser. Once a degree of awareness develops, voice is cultivated. The
cultivation of voice is a tricky endeavor, since the loser may be voiceless even with a voice.
What distinguishes whining from revolutionary articulation? The answer seems to be awareness
of solidarity, not just awareness of the oppression of the power structure. Solidarity is what may
bring the lumpenproletariat to awareness and what may give voice to the subaltern and the loser.
Loser is a term connoting solidarity. Williams asserts: “We’re all fucking losers” (“Saul
Williams Returns” par. 7). By resisting the standard of categorizing individuals into different
groups, Williams’ cosmology creates a solidarity which creates a single class and, in doing so,
does away with class. His cosmology of solidarity allows for the transformation of the
lumpenproletariat and the subaltern into the loser who is aware and uses their voice as a means
of personal and societal transformation. It should be noted, though, that the loser can be found at
many stages of development and may plateau at any stage of development; the loser may be
unaware and voiceless and lacking solidarity, partially aware but voiceless and lacking solidarity,
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partially aware and vocal but lacking solidarity, or, ideally, aware and vocal and having realized
and expressed solidarity. Also worthy of note, solidarity exists even when the loser is said to lack
solidarity. Solidarity is like quantum entanglement3; just because the loser is not aware of it, it
does not mean that it does not exist. The aware and articulate loser knows of the solidarity and
acts accordingly, whereas the other forms of losers are ignorant of the solidarity but not exempt
from it. Just as the oppression is ubiquitous, so is the solidarity.
The solidarity of the loser may reach across theories i.e., the loser may help bring
awareness and voice to the lumpenproletariat and the subaltern. Some losers may never develop
awareness, like the lumpenproletariat, or their own voice, like the subaltern, while others will.
Those who do recognize the oppressive nature of these ideologies and develop their own voice in
defiance of the power structure and in solidarity with the unaware and voiceless loser create a
path to awareness and the development of a voice for the loser, even if the loser does not avail
their self of it. By extension, the loser may also aid the lumpenproletariat in developing
awareness and the subaltern in asserting their voice.
Awareness and Voice and Re-vision and Re-representation
Awareness (re-vision) and voice (re-representation) are key to the transformation of the
lumpenproletariat and the subaltern into losers. I use case studies from White Teeth to explain
the transformation. In chapter 1, I focus more on what renders one unaware and voiceless, while,
in chapter 2, I give more specifics about how one engages in re-vision and re-representation.
Re-presentation, Spivak explains, refers to “‘re-representation’ as in art or philosophy”
and “representation as ‘speaking for’” (70). Re-presentation, “as in art or philosophy,” entails “a
representative consciousness (one re-presenting reality adequately)” (70-71). On the other hand,
Representation “as speaking for” is viewed ominously by Spivak (70). Spivak asserts that the
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subaltern’s “representative must appear simultaneously as their master, as an authority over
them, as unrestricted governmental power that protects them from the other classes” (71). Under
these conditions, the subaltern receives their identity through their relationship with their
representative master.
Spivak asserts that these two types of representation are “related but irreducibly
discontinuous” (70). This irreducible discontinuity occurs as a result of “a model of social
indirect” wherein there are “gaps between the source of ‘influence,’….the ‘representative,’…and
the historical-political phenomenon” (72). In other word, somehow, re-representation is
subjugated to representation as a tool of the power structure which works to reinforce
oppression. Spivak does not adequately explain how these gaps come about or why they
necessarily form. Also, Spivak asserts that conflating the two forms of representation “in order to
say that beyond both is where oppressed subjects speak, act and know for themselves, leads to an
essentialist, utopian politics” (71). This statement is extreme and dogmatist in tone; for instance,
Spivak uses a trigger word, utopian, which evokes an automatic response of skepticism and
perhaps even scorn. Beyond the dogmatic tone, Spivak’s assertion denies the gestalt, in this
instance the result of the sum of parts existing on a continuum between ideal and monstrous.
Perhaps some subalterns cannot speak, their speech being lost in re-presentation; perhaps other
subalterns can speak, being their own representative and receiving their identity through their
relationship with their own self.
In contrast to Spivak’s understanding of representation, Williams believes that rerepresentation as speaking for is possible. He states, “I know that I have well over a million kids
that agree with me and I’m not really speaking my opinion. I’m really speaking theirs” (“An
Interview” 735). Further, Williams rhetorically questions, “if the poetry is not for the people, and
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of course for ourselves and our own healing and growth processes, then what the fuck is it for?”
(“An Interview” 735). The million kids could arguably be those who are already aware who
came upon Williams’ words and identified with them, but they could also be those who
discovered Williams’ words and developed awareness through his words and, hopefully,
eventually develop their own voice. The people are all losers, whether aware or oblivious or
silent or expressive. Williams’ own engagement in re-representation as art or philosophy
indicates that the loser is able to not only refashion the self but is able to speak for those who
identify with the speaker/writer and nurture awareness and encourage articulation in fellow
losers, thus creating a sense of solidarity and the potential for one loser’s re-representation and
representation to act as a catalyst for another loser’s re-representation and representation.
Re-vision and re-visioning are terms used in this essay to convey the action of reappropriation and reclamation of one’s own identity and culture. Re-vision necessarily occurs at
the microcosmic level of self (analogous to Spivak’s re-representation of reality) but also occurs
at the macrocosmic or cultural level (similar to Spivak’s representation). Self and other are
understood to be inextricably joined. As such, introspection of the self affects others. The
individual who re-visions speaks for their self but, having a grasp of solidarity, also speaks for
others i.e., all of the other losers.
The lumpenproletariat, the subaltern, and the loser’s relationships to re-vision and rerepresentation are related to their belief systems, particularly to beliefs about solidarity. The
reason why the lumpenproletariat does not engage in re-visioning and re-representation is clearly
a result of a lack of awareness. The subaltern is said to not engage in re-representation, even
though the subaltern may be aware. Perhaps the reason for the subaltern’s lack of rerepresentation is a lack of re-visioning, which is foundational to re-representation. The question
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remains as to why the loser engages in re-visioning and representation, but the subaltern does
not. The difference is not a matter of awareness of the power structure or ability to exert their
voices. What is different is the re-conceiving of self which results in a sense of solidarity and the
belief of being able to re-conceive and affect reality. The individual who is told that they are
subaltern and believes their self to be voiceless will remain voiceless, perhaps complaining
without effect. Inversely, the individual loser, starting with the self, will exert their voice
knowing that they will eventually impact others and society. The subaltern buys into a myth of
personal powerlessness and the ineffectiveness of solidarity and thereby engages in selfdefeating thoughts and action. The loser is brought to awareness and develops their own voice,
acts which require a change in belief systems, through their own and others’ acts of re-visioning.
The boundaries between the lumpenproletariat, the subaltern, and the loser are not finite.
The lumpenproletariat e.g., the loser as materialistic individual who never really uses their own
voice due to lack of awareness, and the subaltern e.g., the loser as one who is conscious of
injustice but feels powerless to enact change and so really become voiceless, exist alongside the
individual engaged in re-visioning. The loser acts in truth to their self and from a sense of
solidarity. By doing so, perhaps the lumpenproletariat and the subaltern may realize that they are
losers.
Case Studies of the Lumpenproletariat, the Subaltern, and the Loser
In order to examine the lumpenproletariat, the subaltern, and the loser, I will use the
characters in White Teeth as mock case studies. Smith’s characters, situated in an urban area in a
core country affected by global capitalism, have a realistic diversity that makes them ideal for
explication. Specifically, I will examine three different classes – upper proletariat/middle class
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(Joyce Chalfen), proletariat/working class (Samad Iqbal), and subproletariat/unemployed (Millat
Iqbal) – in this paper.
The superstructure – its division and consequential alienation from the act of labor,
product of labor, and species-being – rather than labor is primarily engaged in White Teeth. The
unnamed narrator, asserting that tradition is an equally deleterious but far more insidious means
of oppression than religion, sketches the ways in which the traditions propagated by the
superstructure harm individuals (Smith 161). It is also worthy of note that since the means of
production are continuously revolutionized, all else undergoes change along with it, causing
upheavals in the social structure which leads to emotional, mental, and spiritual agitation (Marx,
“Manifesto” 207). This dis-ease in the social structure may lead individuals to cling more
strongly to tradition.
Joyce Chalfen: A Case Study of a Normative, Middle Class Literati Representative
Despite being vocal, Joyce Chalfen is a lumpenproletariat (dually, in that she is a nonproductive literati and in that she obliviously supports the social structure), a subaltern (in that
she does not have her own voice even if she is a published author), and a loser (in that she is the
type of loser who is unaware and voiceless). Morals, smugly asserts Joyce, originate from those
like herself, the middle class who she views as the “inheritors of the enlightenment” and the
“source of all culture” (Smith 359). Joyce never seems to realize that enlightenment – the base of
revolution – and culture are often at odds. She never steps outside the social norms of the
superstructure to which she was indoctrinated and consequently never engages in re-visioning or
re-representation.
Throughout White Teeth, Joyce reinforces common stereotypes. Religious and ethnic
minorities she pities for their uncivil social mores. Joyce states that Millat (originally her son’s
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acquaintance who she becomes enthralled by, as a mother figure but possibly as more) is better
off being a boy, unbelievable atrocities being forced on girls in Muslim households. This
stereotype was gathered from a Times article, the examples in which she hastily generalizes to all
people of Muslim descent and all practitioners of Islam (Smith 266). She xenophobically views
those from different ethnicities and religions as being defunct, the inferior other. Just as
atrociously, Joyce reinforces patriarchal social norms while claiming to be a feminist. She seeks
a man smarter than herself to marry who will liberate her from thinking. Naturalizing patriarchy,
Joyce restricts women to the limiting role of nurturer. Joyce is perplexed when confronted with a
lesbian couple, not being able to figure out who nurtures and who teaches. Even her literary
works are used to reinforce the idea of women as nurtures. The things that truly bind her liberty
(e.g., gender roles, monogamy, and so on) she calls liberating (269). Additionally, Joyce,
justifying class and reinforcing stereotypes, believes that the middle class are superior because of
good genes and hard work (293). The unstated parallel to Joyce’s dogma is that those who are
working class or who live in poverty are deprived because that is what they deserve; anyone who
is not middle class becomes the undeserving poor, self-made losers.
As an “interpreter,”4 Joyce uses her voice to re-represent in a way that reinforces the
superstructure (Spivak 77). Joyce is a regional leader of culture, verging on being a national
influencer of culture, since her published books sold well. Being an interpreter, Joyce may seem
like the average person, but she holds and reinforces beliefs that benefit the capitalists i.e., those
who oppress the people, while simultaneously oppressing both herself and the rest of the masses.
Pushing her middle class (perfidiously ethnocentric, patriarchal, capitalist) morality, Joyce
engages in a type of corrupt re-representation.
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Joyce produces a “history as narrative…of truth,” in reality a lie that functions as a form
of epistemic violence, in the process of re-representation as an interpreter (Spivak 76, 78).
Mainstream media – Joyce’s book but also other forms of “brain washed [media] cleared of
purpose [such as] radio programing” – serve to make its many “i’s” the individual’s “I”
(Williams, The Dead Emcee Scrolls 147). Joyce re-represents the identity of the
lumpenproletariat, the subaltern, and the loser in the process of forming her own identity. She
holds the lumpenproletariat and the subaltern, which she would probably consider incompetent
losers, up to herself as a mirror in order to delude herself that the middle class are not losers.
Joyce’s superstructure driven re-representation is in keeping with Spivak’s assertion that the
subaltern cannot speak through the scholar, that the literati only represent themselves when
speaking for the subaltern (70). In speaking for herself, Joyce unconsciously speaks for the
capitalist, thus upholding a superstructure that is contrary to her own good. Joyce is not
conscious of the corruption of the power structure and does not have her own voice. As such,
Joyce is a lumpenproletariat and a subaltern, the type of loser who is unaware and voiceless and
lacks solidarity.
Despite being considered successful in the general public’s view, particularly pertaining
to her book publications, Joyce is an oblivious and voiceless loser who has not heeded the voice
of the loser who speaks against the corruption of the social and economic structure. She is
unaware of her role in the perpetuation of the power structure and merely reiterates the mores of
society. She has not engaged in re-visioning and so is unable to re-represent herself or other
losers despite her access to media which would easily allow her to do so.
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Samad Iqbal: A Case Study of a Tradition Bound, Relapsed Lumpenproletariat
If Joyce is a subaltern without her own history and effectively voiceless, Samad Iqbal is
doubly so. Samad is rendered voiceless because of his economic status and also because of his
ethnic and religious identity. His identity being Bangladeshi and Islam, he is considered other.
While at first Samad is rightfully repulsed by the economic power structure, he makes the
mistake of not realizing that the social structure, even Islam, is determined by the economic
structure. Tradition, muses the obliviously laboring lumpenproletariat Samad, is in White Teeth
synonymous with culture and roots which Samad views as inherently good. Tradition/culture/
roots are what saves, the spiritual line thrown to the man overwhelmed in a sea of moral flux.
Yet, the ascetic tenets of the traditions that Samad seeks to follow are unattainable, impossible to
follow due to the inhuman nature of the tenets, at least in a capitalistic society. Still, despite the
mental, emotional, and spiritual turmoil that results from him being unable to follow tradition,
Samad believes that tradition is good. The narrator notes that even if someone were to point out
to Samad that even weeds have roots or that rot often starts at the roots that he would take no
heed to it (161).
Samad lacks awareness of the substructures within the superstructure. What he fails to
understand is that there are “layers of meaning” to tradition that must be deciphered and
critiqued (Williams, The Dead Emcee Scrolls xxviii). Tradition is subject to re-representation.
Islam – any patriarchal mainstream religion such as Christianity, “[c]hurch of…back of /
bus…hold your tongue…fear…sick[ness]…hell…born / in sin…short on rent” (Williams, The
Dead Emcee Scrolls 9) – is utilized to enact conformity. Before Islam, however, there was
gnosis, particularly Jewish Gnosticism, which is not based on tradition but direct experience with
the divine. “Before before,” there was no division between God and man (Williams, The Dead
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Emcee Scrolls 29); there is a tradition that bespeaks of a time before division between male and
female gender roles, light and dark skin, East and West, Islamic and pagan, before patriarchy,
racism, religious and intellectual superiority complexes, even before anthropocentrism. Samad
does not go far enough back through tradition to recall that before Islam was the dominant
religion of his home country of Bangladesh, there was Hinduism, before that speculatively an
earth religion. Nowhere in White Teeth does it indicate that Samad rejects the culture of
Bangladesh before Islam. The only culture that he actively rejects is Western culture, which is
predominately Christian in religion. Rather, any earlier cultures seem to be lost to him. Samad
has already been forced into assimilation, his Hindu heritage and even earlier roots already
having been stripped from him.
Partially aware at the beginning of his story, Samad is critical of the power structure but
feels helpless. Circuitously but predictably, Samad’s experience shows how the superstructure
supports the oppression of capitalism. It is Samad’s desire to follow tradition that results in him
supporting the economic structure, ministering to “the endless needs and the needless ends” of
the masses of the West where abides “neither patience nor pity,” where “people expect...their
lovers...children... friends…and even...gods” to be delivered quickly and cheaply (Smith 172).
Since “[a] man is a man is a man” (Smith 216), Samad must support a superstructure which
oppresses him like his father and his father’s fathers (76); he must fight a war that cripples him
and work a job that makes him feel degraded. While fighting in the war, Samad repeats as if a
chant “I’m a Muslim and a Man and a Son and a Believer” (101). He takes on the roles which
Bangladeshi culture most values. As a civilian worker, after gaining the economic responsibility
of supporting a wife and buying a better house, Samad muses that he wants to wear the following
sign while working:
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I AM NOT A WAITER. I HAVE BEEN A STUDENT, A SCIENTIST, A SOLDIER,
MY WIFE IS CALLED ALSANA, WE LIVE IN EAST LONDON BUT WE WOULD
LIKE TO MOVE NORTH. I AM A MUSLIM BUT ALLAH HAS FORSAKEN ME OR
I HAVE FORSAKEN ALLAH, I’M NOT SURE. I HAVE A FRIEND – ARCHIE –
AND OTHERS. I AM FORTY-NINE BUT WOMEN STILL TURN IN THE STREET.
SOMETIMES. (49)
While still valuing the identities esteemed in Bangladeshi culture, Samad is struggling with the
identity placed upon him in Western culture. Quickly thereafter, Samad dejectedly discovers that
he only has value at the restaurant as an employee, not a student nor scholar nor fighter nor
husband nor Muslim nor friend nor lover (49).
The fact that Samad is disturbed by the identity assigned to him means that he is
somewhat aware that there is something wrong. However, he does not seem to be aware that
what is causing him pain is the power structure and the culture, both Western and Islamic, that it
is the root of his distress. As such, Samad is an at least partially oblivious lumpenproletariat, a
lumpenproletariat whose anger could lead to awareness. Since Samad only thinks about his
different identities and never actually voices them, he is subaltern. He is a loser whose
dissatisfaction with self and culture could result in the development of awareness and a voice.
Finding his labor and its rewards lacking, Samad turns to the mores of the superstructure,
to fundamentalist Islam, which distracts and sedates him, thus nullifying his potential. The Islam
that Samad follows is not an Islam that he re-visioned but merely a subculture of the
superstructure. Allah, more accurately Samad’s conception of Allah as produced by the
superstructure, essentially becomes Samad’s representative master who has almost unrestricted
power over his identity and who is expected to shelter and bless (Spivak 71).
However, the spiritual and physical mores of Islam being untenable, Samad feels guilt,
and his identity is further distorted. Outside of work, he is “a masturbator, a bad husband, an
indifferent father, with all the morals of an Anglican” (Smith 118). Consequently, he eagerly
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takes up his position at work as the crippled yet gifted lead waiter (118). The customers who he
complained against as those who gave up faith for sex and then sex for power (a twisted path that
Samad himself ends up following) are now the people who he takes pleasure in serving as the
lead waiter (172). Morally, Samad has been assimilated into the masses by way of religion.
Instead of moving forward through re-visioning, he becomes a lumpenproletariat who reinforces
the power structure, mindlessly fulfilling his job as a means to escape the spiritual pain caused
by the superstructure in the form of tradition.
Samad’s experience with tradition, traditions that are little more than a policing
mechanism that gives stability to the economic powers that be, is in keeping with Spivak’s
explanation of Marx’s view of value (identity) in a capitalist society. Spivak states that value is
determined “as the representation sign of objectified labor,” that labor acts as a sign which
determines the signifier as labor (73-74). In other words, the sum of Samad is reduced to his
labor, labor which supports the power structure and its accompanying superstructure. Samad
becomes a loser in the mainstream sense of the term particularly in that he places blame on
himself instead of realizing the role of the social and economic structure. Samad regresses from a
partially aware but voiceless loser to the type of loser who is oblivious and voiceless like the
lumpenproletariat and subaltern.
Samad fails at re-representation in his attempt to be a regional leader for Islam. His
efforts fall on deaf ears and are even scorned. Samad’s failed attempt at re-representation is due
to the fact that those who are dominant in one location may not be dominant elsewhere (Spivak
79). Not only can the variation in dominance apply to location, but it can also be true within
groups of people within the same area. Samad may have some authority with Muslims of his
own age in his area, but he has no say among the more youthful and assertive fundamentalist
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Muslims in the area nor with those who follow normative middle-class morality. Samad fails
because he works within the traditional systems with traditional means.
Being unable to represent himself, Samad attempts to represent the past and the future but
is unable to successfully exert his voice. Concerning the past, Samad lauds his ancestor, Mangal
Pande, as a revolutionary and war hero. However, his endeavors to rewrite, to re-vision and rerepresent, his ancestor’s place in history as a hero are constantly checked. Marcus Chalfen,
Joyce’s husband and a respected scientist, tells others not to take Samad’s words seriously (280).
Even Samad’s best friend, Archie, attempts to disprove Samad by referring to scholarly books to
make his point (209). Samad’s voice is ignored or combated, silencing him no matter how much
he speaks. Regarding the future, Samad attempts to control the future by shaping the characters
of his sons, Millat and Magid. As Europeans viewed themselves as “men saving brown women
from brown men” in colonizing India and subjugating India to its laws and norms (Spivak 93),
Samad views himself as an Eastern, Muslim man saving the already westernized youth from the
West. Having only enough money to save one son, he sends Magid to Bangladesh to learn
Islamic tradition and counts Millat as lost to his Islamic heritage. However, Magid turns to
secular Western morals, and Millat turns to a form of Western fundamentalist Islam even too
radical for Samad; in the end, both sons are Englishified (286). Having no voice to shape the
cultures that his children grew up in, Samad is unable to influence their characters in a desired
manner and so is unable to implement the future that he envisions. Whether it is through the past
or the future, Samad attempts re-representation through others. He never re-visions himself, and,
as a consequence, he is unsuccessful at both types of re-representation.
While realizing the corruption of a capitalist power structure, Samad fails to see that the
religion and traditions that he defines himself by are merely extensions of the power structure.
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As such, Samad is not fully aware of the oppression enacted upon him by the power structure
and remains at least partially a lumpenproletariat. Being unable to re-represent his present, past,
and future, Samad is subaltern. Samad is at best a partially aware but voiceless loser. If Samad
were to become aware of the fact that Islam – not Islam itself but the way in which Samad
dogmatically follows his version of Islam – is part of the power structure which represses him,
he would ideally seek out a new identity and reality and, in doing so, would bring him to revision himself. Only then would he have hope of re-representing his children and the rest of his
reality and, in doing so, exert his voice, the voice of the loser.
Millat Iqbal: A Case Study of the Perversely Liminal Oppressed Oppressor
Perhaps the most complex example of a loser in White Teeth, Millat Iqbal (Samad’s son)
is other in a group of others. Millat is caught between his father’s beliefs and middle-class
morality and so loses his individuality. Like the subaltern woman of India, Millat is “caught
between tradition and modernization” (Spivak 102). Millat seeks to construct his identity as a
counter culture against a counter culture that has become a regionally dominant culture, at least
in Millat’s home, which itself was originally a counter culture, when compared to normative
middle-class culture, against a dominant culture. Millat is swept away by the Western need to be
scientific and an Eastern based “nostalgia for lost origins” (Spivak 93).
As a youth, Millat is on the verge of revisioning himself. Millat knows himself to be
neither a fool nor a follower (Smith 181). Constantly shapeshifting, Millat hedonistically does as
he pleases, purposefully going against the morals of his father and of society (182). Certainly,
Millat has not quite developed his own voice, but he exhibits a degree of awareness and freedom.
He strives against being a loser, in this sense a loser as a fool and a follower, which the unaware
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and voiceless arguably are. At this point, Millat is not quite fully lumpenproletariat nor
subaltern; he is on the path to becoming the type of loser who is both aware and vocal.
Soon thereafter, Millat discovers that he exists in an in-between state, not being Christian
and English nor Muslim and Bengali (Smith 291). Pressured to please multiple subcultures
incessantly – being not only the daredevil, trickster, respected womanizer, drug user, hero, and
voice of his generation, constantly changing his identity to suit his peers – Millat feels the
pervading pain and anger of “belonging nowhere that comes to people who belong everywhere”
(225). At the same time, to mainstream culture, Millat realizes that he is a bum or a job stealing,
turban wearing, elephant worshipping Paki who is not welcome in America and that he is limited
by other’s expectations to being a waiter like his father or a dentist at best. Millat realizes that he
has no voice and that his image is not reflected in American culture. He is one of the many
angry, having neither “face [nor] voice in this country” (194).
Despite trying out many roles and being a leader among some of the subcultures,
Millat’s individuation is stunted, since he merely shapeshifts between the roles listed above
which are projected upon him. He does not truly engage in re-visioning and never has a voice of
his own. He is a lumpenproletariat, albeit an angry one, and a subaltern who speaks in order to
fit into the many subcultures of the superstructure rather than for re-visioning the subcultures and
mainstream culture which denigrate and limit him. Although Millat is a leader, he does not revision his self and so does not re-represent his self or the others for whom he speaks.
Morally rebellious yet counterculture typical, Millat finds solidarity among others who
are angry and voiceless like himself in the Keepers of the Eternal and Victorious Islamic Nation
(KEVIN). Though Millat joins KEVIN as a means of exerting himself, he loses his voice. Millat
dogmatically enforces the inhibiting tenets of KEVIN, rejecting the irrational faith of his father
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for the rational Qur’an and the depraved, freedom crazed West for fundamentalist Islam (Smith
368). Not only inhibiting himself by giving up sex and other actions labeled carnal, Millat also
polices others. Regurgitating leaflet words, Millat accuses Karina Cane – the girl who he initially
describes as having a “sense of humor that felt like a miracle” – of being a whore, despite her
adamant answer that she respects herself and that her clothes are chosen to please herself (311).
Because of the propaganda, Millat can no longer envision a good woman as being anything other
than the restrained women of KEVIN. Yet worse, Millat essentially tells Karina that he will have
sex with her whenever he wants (i.e., that he will rape her), that she is not to enjoy sex, and that
she should be ladylike by not being vocal during sex (309). Millat is ruled by and enforces moral
tenets, the epistemically violent tenets of KEVIN, external and contrary to his own being. Sadly,
Millat does not realize that KEVIN is just another subculture, claiming to be both a
counterculture and the rightful dominant culture, of the superstructure. He has taken on the role
of a leader of a subculture of the superstructure and voices words which are not his own.
Through his lack of awareness, he has lost his voice and has become a subaltern. Like his father,
Millat regresses to a one-dimensional lumpenproletariat, a subaltern who engages in
representation for an oppressive power structure, and the unaware and voiceless loser that he
dreaded to become. Without realizing it, Millat becomes the fool and follower that he adamantly
rejected.
After joining KEVIN, Millat still struggles to grasp his identity, his coveted image of the
gangster clashing with the image of the Islamic holy man expected of him (368). Being
Bangladeshi and Islamic in Western society (his marginalized familial associations within the
dominant social structure) or being Western within a Bangladeshi and Islamic subculture (his
assimilated Western affinities within his family structure), Millat is rendered psychologically
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marginal and consequently feels the need to demonstrate to himself and others his devotion to his
chosen culture, much like the Indian women who commit the ceremonial self-emulation of sati
(Spivak 94). Just as it is generally the vulnerable, the women in a patriarchal society, who
commit sati, so it is usually the vulnerable, the poor in a capitalist society, who sacrifice
themselves for the mores of a given belief; it is the psychologically, ethnically, and religiously
marginalized Millat who literally and figuratively pulls the trigger of the gun as a means of
establishing his dominance in KEVIN by killing the God usurping, Oncomouse creating scientist
Marcus Chalfen. “Millat is reaching like Pande,” reliving his ancestor’s life rather than revisioning his own (442). In this way – even if Millat is playing the role of a revolutionary, gun
and all – he is still voiceless; he is subaltern.
Yet, Millat’s character and actions can also be reinterpreted, as with hip-hop, as a “cry for
respect,” “a cry for power and / to be recognized” (Williams, The Dead Emcee Scrolls xxviixxviii). Sometimes, the oppressed, when they begin to recognize their own power, abuse their
newfound power in a manner similar to the way violence was enacted against them (xxviii). In
this way, Millat’s history parallels the history of hip-hop. Hip-hop, according to Williams who
grew up nurtured on hip-hop, once was a means of expression and challenging the powers that be
and the norms they perpetuate. This early phase in hip-hop resembles Millat’s pre-moralindoctrination years. Now, hip-hop reflects capitalist ideology, the same ideas that sold the
ancestors of the producers and listeners of hip-hop into slavery. Instead of questioning a system
of greed, hip-hop perpetuates capitalism and its tenets of misogyny and violence among its
listeners through the “romanticism of gangsterism” (xxvii) that involves putting others down in
order to prove one’s own superiority (109). This later phase in hip-hop resembles Millat’s
KEVIN years. Williams calls out hip-hop for being negligent, for allowing itself to be “defined
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by something less than yourself,” as Millat himself has been defined by something so very less
than himself i.e., tradition, religion, expectations and so on (114).
There is hope; perhaps the subaltern can speak. Millat is angry, a currently misdirected
anger but an anger that can be used for voicing malcontent and demanding revolution. Though he
is not fully conscious of what is causing him pain (not just the judgement and expectations of
society but also his beloved Islam), he is aware that something needs to be balked against. Millat
is like “NGHs kill[ing] NGHs in Jesus’s name” (Williams, The Dead Emcee Scrolls 45); he’s
killing off one part of himself, the Western, with another part of himself, the Eastern. Despite his
misguided actions, Millat is willing to take control over his own life, to violently fight a system
that he views as a threat to his wellbeing. Millat has a voice, but it is a voice that upholds one of
the many forms of tradition of the power structure, thus rendering him virtually voiceless. Millat
regurgitates pamphlet words as hip-hop artists now spew out capitalistic propaganda. What is
lacking is not a voice but introspection, questioning and meditation on his own beloved tenets
that would allow his voice to be meaningful. If Millat were to engage in introspection and
questioning of culture, perhaps he would see the false idols that he has made out of science and a
religion founded upon beliefs averse to his self. He would see that the path that he has chosen is
a circuitous path merging with pure science (the 5%), the coercive wrath of a gangster (the 10
%), and the many other paths that lead to nowhere but dead ends (the 85%) (166); he would
realize that he needs to abandon the “future slave narrative,” to forge his own path of “I, self,
lord and master” whereby he could become the aware and assertive loser engaged in
representation (20).
This self-forged path of revision may not take a traditional form. Millat is a child of
tradition, not the perverse tradition of the superstructure, like the children of hip-hop listed by
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Williams – Portishead (trip-hop), Led Zeppelin (hard rock), and Bjork (multi-genre: classical,
techno, pop, jazz, folk and other) – who still engage in status quo questioning (Williams, The
Dead Sea Scrolls 114). Yes, Millat is enacting the part of a fundamentalist, gun raised, but, in
that moment, he is also witness to a man facing the gun for love of another and the freeing of
another being.
At the end of White Teeth, the reader is challenged to divide the present into those
“whose eyes fell upon a bleeding man, slumped across a table, and those who watched the
getaway of a small brown rebel mouse” (Smith 448). The bleeding man, Archie, whom Millat
shoots in an attempt to shoot Marcus Chalfen, kept his eyes on the mouse, thinking “Go on my
son” (448). Inadvertently, the combined actions of Millat (the embodiment of anger and passion)
and Archie (the long-suffering enactment of love) have set a fellow being free. Perhaps Millat
will come to see that his actions should not have been directed against Marcus Chalfen, who
represents the West in Millat’s mind, but at freeing the Oncomouse, a fellow being who has lost
their freedom to the traditional ideology of anthropocentrism. Perhaps Millat will see the
possibility for freedom for himself as well. If such were to be Millat’s future, the future that
Smith challenges her readers to imagine for themselves, then Millat may, in the end, cast off the
lumpenproletariat lack of awareness and voicelessness of the subaltern for the awareness and the
voice of the loser who re-visions and re-represents self and society. Perhaps, like the best of hiphop which joins the strength of vulnerability with the care for the craft of words such as is found
in poetry, Millat will rename himself and ply the best in himself to a self-determined channel of
art or philosophy or to whatever else his form of re-visioning and re-representation may be.
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The Hope for Re-visioning and Re-representation
Could Millat’s voice be effective? What does a newly aware individual have to do to
avoid the mistakes of those who came before? What does one have to do to avoid being carried
back into slavery? (Williams, Dead Emcee Scrolls 108). What does one have to do to guard
against the insidious, seemingly ubiquitous indoctrination of the superstructure propagated by
capitalism?
Williams ambiguously asserts that “sometimes we need to stand on the shoulders of our
ancestors, sometimes we have to stand on their necks” (Williams, “An Interview” 735).
Sometimes, one has to break with the past and the current culture that results from the past.
Other times, the past and culture is a means of enlightenment. Re-visioning is a tricky process,
one of picking and choosing, of trial and error, of death and rebirth; it is a place of in-betweens, a
place of dis-comfort. Anyone who re-visions has to make their home, albeit a troubled home, in
the in-betweens.
However, being open minded is not enough. Williams states that “If we don’t break the
rules, we perpetuate the pattern.” (Williams, US(a) 17). One means of dismantling capitalism
and its superstructure is through rebelling with “thought, words, music, a collage of evolutionary
shifts that might explain how one generation goes from being colored to black, and another that
infuses ‘nigger’ with love” (19). Anything that works to shift consciousness can be used as a
means of rebellion. In order to make one’s voice effective, capitalistic means often have to be
used. Williams explains, “You can’t buy freedom, but let’s buy some airtime and shelf-space and
elevate this freedom of speech” (Williams, The Dead Emcee Scrolls vii). Another form of
enacting change is enacting legislation (Williams, US(a) 17). Still, legislation often falls short,
and Williams even writes in some of his early poetry that he is unsure whether or not his words
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ever reach and affect their intended audience (Williams, She 76). Yet, in a more recent interview
he states that he is the voice for a million or more people (Williams, “An Interview” 35).
Considering Williams’ success, it seems that the loser can have a voice.
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Notes
1. The proletariat, “a class of labourers…who must sell themselves piecemeal, are a
commodity, like every other article of commerce” (Marx, “Manifesto” 211). The proletarian
movement, Marx defines as “the self-conscious, independent movement of the immense
majority, in the interest of the immense majority…[that]cannot stir, cannot raise itself up,
without the whole superincumbent strata of official society being blown to pieces” (216). There
are multiple differences between the proletariat and the loser. (1) Unlike the proletariat, the loser
can come from any social class, even the bourgeois or capitalists. (2) In contrast to the
proletariat, the loser feels a sense of solidarity with people from all strata of society, including
the lumpenproletariat. (3) The loser is not dependent on the majority to affect change. (4) The
loser may use capitalistic means. The reason the lumpenproletariat instead of the proletariat was
chosen as a comparison to the subaltern and loser is because the proletariat is generally not
disparaged, considered Other, unlike the lumpenproletariat, subaltern, and loser. Also,
examining the proletariat would be redundant since the proletariat is the same as the subaltern
until the majority sways towards revolution.
2. An example of an employed (proletariat) but unaware (lumpenproletariat) individual is
Samad Iqbal from White Teeth; he works full time but fails to understand that the superstructure
(culture) is part of the oppressive structure of capitalism (Smith 161) An example of the
unemployed (lumpenproletariat) but aware (proletariat) is Neena Begum also from White Teeth.
Her mere existence as a lesbian challenges the heteronormative mores of her family, but she also
purposefully challenges the other characters to engage in re-vision. For instance, one of her lines
is as follows: “you’ve been taught all kinds of shit. You’ve got to reeducate yourself. Realize
your value, stop the slavish devotion, and get a life” (237).
3. Quantum entanglement “is the property of the quantum mechanical state of a system
containing two or more objects, where the objects that make up the system are linked in a way
that one cannot adequately describe the quantum state of a constituent of the system without full
mention of its counterparts, even if the individual objects are spatially separated” (Moran vii).
4. There is in colonized peoples a group of “interpreters” between those who hold power
and the masses (Spivak 77). The categories are “1. Dominant foreign groups. 2. Dominant
indigenous groups on the all-Indian level. 3. Dominant indigenous groups at the regional and
local levels. 4. [the masses]” (79). If this model is applied to a core country such as England or
America, it might be categorized as follows: 1. The capitalists i.e., those in power. 2. Those who
symbolize morality and identity at the national level e.g., politicians, celebrities etc., 3. Leaders
of community or regional subcultures i.e., often but not necessarily those who emulate the
previous group. 4. The masses.
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CHAPTER 2
AWARENESS AND VOICE BEYOND CAPITALISM:
A PSYCHOANALYTIC AND DIALECTIC PERSPECTIVE
Laugh through saturated-striated meaning, through affirmed-rhythmic identity.
Laugh into a void composed of logical, syntactic, and narrative surplus.
(Julia Kristeva, Desire in Language 181)
This chapter moves beyond an examination of capitalism. I begin by reviewing modernist
metanarratives and postmodern narratives. Modernist metanarratives, such as those that are
found in Karl Marx’s and Gayatri Spivak’s works, are rejected as being unrepresentative of
reality. Postmodern narratives, such as those found in Saul Williams’ works, are retained for
their accurate portrayal of the complex relationship between the parts of the self and the self to
the other. Postmodern narratives align with explanations posited by psychoanalytic theorists such
as Carl Jung and Julia Kristeva and also make way for a discussion of discourse. Hope for self
and society lies in psychoanalysis, self-realization, and individuation, all of which may be
brought about by discourse and myth making. Yet, discourse may also be used to pathologize, as
is evident in White Teeth. Again, I use the characters in White Teeth to present examples of
postmodern narratives; stagnation, progression, and regression along the path to self-realization/
individuation; discourse that pathologizes and discourse that leads to re-visioning and rerepresentation.
Insufficiencies of Marxism and of Spivak’s Postcolonialism
Theoretically, this chapter moves from a discussion of Marxism and post-colonialism to
psychoanalytic texts and their emphasis on individuation and discourse is the focus of attention.
Karl Marx’s lumpenproletariat and Gayatri Spivak’s subaltern can be classified as a modernist
metanarratives of identity and power. (See Raby’s “What is Resistance?” or the discussion below
for information on modernist metanarratives and postmodern narratives.) The lumpenproletariat
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subject and the subaltern subject are static. As such, they do not have a way to re-visioning and
re-representation in and of their self. In comparison, Saul Williams’ loser(s) is a postmodern
subject that has an inherent path to power through discourse. In order to give insight and further
expound on Williams’ work, the self, and discourse, I will explore Carl Jung’s and Julia
Kristeva’s theories. Jung’s and Kristeva’s psychoanalysis, self-realization, and individuation
serve as a framework to discuss how dialect and power intersect within the individual and
culture.
Discomfort may be a catalyst to awareness; however, capitalism alone is not the source of
the distress, and awareness of and rebellion against capitalism is not sufficient for re-vision and
re-representation. Additionally, the individual must have awareness of their self and their
relationship to discourse, thus the inclusion of Jung’s and Kristeva’s theories. The characters in
White Teeth are undoubtedly ill at ease, the discomfort of which brings them to the brink of
awareness. Marx prophesied a time when the proletariat would become aware of their alienation
and rebel. Spivak speaks of the distress and helpless awareness of being marginalized between
vying hegemonic powers. When Williams talks of the loser as “the lowest rungs, the
disenfranchised, the people who don’t matter, who are brutalized or displaced” (“Saul Williams
Returns” par. 7), he speaks against the unbounded materialism of capitalism and the
“romanticism of gangsterism,” which is the capitalism of illicit substances and violence (The
Dead Emcee Scrolls xxvii), and gives voice to what he perceives is a growing awareness, for the
loser is also “those who identify with the disenfranchised and don’t want to consider themselves
free until everyone is free” (“Saul William Returns” par. 7). Despite the emphasis placed on
capitalism, capitalism is not the origin of the problem, even if it is a component of it. Mere
rebellion against capitalism is not the solution. Marxism and, in certain aspects, Spivak’s
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postcolonialism, fall short. Williams’ theories seem more inclusive; he acknowledges spirituality
as well as economy, and he acknowledges the individual’s subjective experience along with the
objective. However, Williams’ theories are not thoroughly articulated. As such, I incorporate
psychoanalytic theory – primarily the theories of Carl Jung and the theories of Julia Kristeva to a
lesser extent – for further explication, seeing that Jung’s and Kristeva’s theories seem to overlap
with Williams’ theories.
Like Marx, Jung speaks of the harm which the modern means of production have
wrought, but Jung argues that a lack of self-exploration and self-expression are the real cause of
affliction. Jung recognizes and speaks, though using different words, against the alienation from
the product of labor, alienation from the act of labor, and alienation from the species being i.e.,
alienation from the individual’s self and the individual’s peers (Jung, The Earth has a Soul 155).
Unlike Marx, Jung treats alienation as an individual psychological phenomenon rather than a
rally cry against capitalism. Jung critiques Marx’s failure to recognize the subjectivity of
alienation and subjugation. Jung gives the following example: “When many people possess cars,
the man with only one car is a proletarian deprived of the goods of this world and therefore
entitled to overthrow the social order” (144). Furthermore, Marx’s theories have been distorted
and associated with National Socialism, which Jung calls “a vast intoxication that has plunged
Europe into indescribable catastrophe” (133). Marxism has become the new intoxication, the
new “opium of the people” (Marx qtd. in Jung, The Earth has a Soul 133). Socialism, “social
welfare,” does “nothing to overcome…spiritual stagnation” (Jung, The Earth has a Soul 145).
Society, the collective, “lacks soul” primarily because the individual is not given sufficient
access to “personal expression” (156). The modern industrial employee has become “a pathetic,
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rootless being,” according to Jung (155). The individual must gain insight into and express their
self as well as address capitalism and the superstructure.
Spivak’s theories are more realistic than Marx’s in that she recognizes the subjectivity
employed as a means of implementing and maintaining power; however, unlike Jung, she does
not sufficiently address the individual’s subjectivity. In “The Rani of Sirmur,” Spivak discusses
how history becomes imperialistic (251). She examines how archives filled with the writings of
British politicians, merchants, and soldiers are used for the “construction of a fiction whose task
was to produce a whole collective of ‘effects of the real,’ and that ‘misreading’ of this ‘fiction’
produced the proper name ‘Indian’” (249). Spivak warns that even seemingly objective
documents, particularly historical documents, have their own social, political, and economic
contextualities which should be considered (250). She states that “meaning/knowledge intersects
power” (255). The example that she gives is that of the British government taking steps to ensure
that the indigenous population does not learn more military tactics than what the government
desires (255). Controlling access to meaning/ knowledge enables those in power to continue their
oppression. Spivak’s emphasis on the construction of meaning/knowledge is undoubtedly rooted
in her understanding of psychoanalytic texts. Still, despite the fact that Spivak addresses
subjectivity, she fails to address the subjectivity of the individual and, since the subaltern cannot
speak, fails to see the subjectivity of the individual’s relationship to power. For this reason, I will
integrate Jung’s theories and the work of other psychoanalysts, which take into account
objectivity and subjectivity and society and the individual.
A Modernist Metanarrative vs. Postmodern Theories of Identity
Rebecca Raby’s “What is Resistance?,” which describes the metanarrative of modernist
theories of identity and the narratives of postmodernist theories of identity, provides a means of
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contextualizing Marx’s, Spivak’s, and Jung’s theories. Also, I include an article by Judith
Howard to bolster support for a postmodern perspective. Finally, I introduce the relationship
between postmodern narratives and discourse.
A modernist metanarrative of identity and power relations – which Marxism and even
Spivak’s post-colonialism, to a lesser extent, fall into – fails to address the subjectivity of reality,
depicting the subject as coherent and rational and the power dynamic as binary with distinct
boundaries between those in power and the oppressed wherein power is wielded by the dominant
against the oppressed. Such metanarratives grant the individual an easily intelligible sense of
morality, agency, and path of resistance (155). As was shown in the previous chapter and will be
further evidenced in the present chapter, such a simplistic notion of the individual and power
relations does not hold true.
Postmodern theories, which Jung’s theories and other psychoanalytic theories fall into,
see the individual as fragmented and take into account latent states. In postmodern narratives, the
boundaries between oppressor and oppressed are blurred and identifying and assessing morality,
agency, and resistance becomes difficult (Raby 161). Particularly, the individual may be
fragmented at the psychological level as relates to conscious and unconscious states as well as
when it comes to identity e.g., identifying with both the dominant culture and a subculture.
Judith Howard’s concisely titled article “Social Psychology of Identity” gives an
overview of social psychological theories and empirical findings relating to identity and supports
the postmodern theories of identity and power relations. Individuals “construct and cross borders
of various categories in defining themselves” based on which culture or subculture the individual
is engaged with (372). Not only does the individual cross borders of identity, the individual can
hold multilayered identities:
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some actively identify with both (or more) groups, experiencing multiple perspectives
simultaneously; others border—cross actively by shifting among different identities as
they move among different social contexts; and yet others locate themselves on a border,
experiencing “mestiza” consciousness,…a destabilization of unified identity expressed
in the language of fluidity, migration, post colonialism, and displacement. (376, 287)
As such, empirical studies of identity support the postmodern concepts of identity rather than a
modernist metanarrative.
Discourse, according to postmodernist thought, is the means by which the subject is
formed, comes to understand his/herself, and exerts power (Raby 161). Discourse is closely
related to power in that discourse is primary to all individuals, all individuals having access to
power, all be it different relationships to power. Of course, discourse can take the form of verbal
communication through language but is also found in other symbols, visual symbols being potent
means of conveying and exerting power as well.
Discourse in Psychoanalytic Theories of Identity
The “talking cure”1 is another term for psychoanalysis (Schultz & Schultz 296).
Psychoanalysis is rooted in discourse. Sigmund Freud, Carl Jung, Jacques Lacan, and Julia
Kristeva are the most commonly referred to discursive psychoanalytic theorists2. Freud will not
be addressed because Jung protested any dependence on Freud, exerting that he had already
formulated his “scientific attitude and the theory of complexes before [he] met Freud” (Jung qtd.
in Shamdasani, “Introduction” 11). Freud and Jung both worked towards the same goal of
grounding psychology in science through clinical work, but their theories and methods were
often at odds. Jung’s theories will be the primary focus. Despite the fact that Jung’s and Lacan’s
theories are conflicting, Lacan’s theories on discourse are worthy of note, even if the theories are
only to be dismissed. Jung’s and Kristeva’s theories, despite Kristeva’s attempts to distance
herself from Jung, are complimentary to one another.
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Lacan is postmodernist but also modernist; as such, his theories are rejected as not being
wholly reflective of reality. Lacan asserts in Ecrits that words, language, and symbols create
reality (229). It is a reality wherein the “truth in speech” is utilized so that the individual realizes
that reality is “neither true nor false” but, like the individual him/herself, is subjective (212).
Symbols act on the individual – “the symbol has made him speak” – to the extent that Lacan tries
to prove that freedom is an illusion (229). The example which Lacan gives is the individual’s
participation in marriage, a symbol which the individual undertakes without understanding why,
which is really culture, culture being synonymous with language, achieving mastery over nature
(229). Symbols – particularly the first symbol that the child ever sees, his/her mirror image –
cause an alienation which becomes an essential feature of the individual which cannot be
transcended; the ego itself becomes other (76, 79). As a result, Lacan depicts the individual as
forever fragmented and subject to culture. Lacan’s concept of identity is postmodern but his
conceptualization of the individual’s relationship to power follows a modernist metanarrative of
identity. Lacan’s and Jung’s theories are at odds. While Jung would undoubtedly agree that some
people, perhaps Lacan included, do remain fragmented throughout the course of their lifetime,
his process of individuation allows the individual to become aware of and to integrate, even only
if tenuously, the fragmented parts of the psyche. Jung also recognizes that the individual’s
psyche and culture are reflexive, thus recognizing the power of the individual to also construct
society3.
Kristeva, in Desire in Language, views language as a margin, a boundary of “upheaval,
dissolution, and transformation” (23). Rhythm (equivalent to the instinctual part of the
individual, the unconscious, desire) must be recognized as a component of the signified structure
(the conscious, culture, the sign, formal components of language such as grammar) (24). The
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individual is shaped by language but must also recreate his/her own language, thereby balancing
the opposites of rhythm and sign, nature and culture, instinct and will, unconscious and
conscious (97). This balancing of self and the superstructure results in the individual being a
“not-me in me, beside me, outside of me, where the me becomes lost” (163). This disjointed and
joined individual is a “heterogeneous... body,...a text” (163). The individual, for Kristeva, is
fragmented; the individual may continue to be fragmented through the repression of their own
nature by culture and as a result of an ignorance of their unconscious, or they may continuously
join the opposites of their fragmented psyche to form an ever-changing self. Besides Kristeva’s
enlightening emphasis on the spoken and written words rather than symbols as a whole and her
inexplicable exclusion of the archetypes, Jung’s and her theories are congruent. Given the
congruency between Jung and Kristeva, I will refer to Kristeva’s theories periodically.4
Jung writes of the “dialogue” that occurs between the unconscious and the conscious, in
this instance the “‘other’ voice” which is the “inner critic or judge” that wells up from the
unconscious and the ego during the process of individuation (Jung “The Transcendent Function”
301, 291). While words are the most recognizable form of language, symbols also serve as a
dialect. Dialogue can also occur through “enrichment and clarification of the affect,” engaging
fantasies, and creating and examining various forms of art such as writing and drawing (290-92).
The best example of the dialogue that occurs during the individuation process can be found in
The Red Book wherein Jung describes and then examines his own fantasies. Jung dialogues with
his own soul: “My soul spoke to me in a whisper, urging and alarming” (Jung, The Red Book
347).
Kristeva’s concept of dialogue is complimentary to Jung’s, which is best observed in The
Red Book and Desire in Language. Dialogue in The Red Book and Kristeva’s Desire in
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Language are strikingly similar, despite the fact that Desire in Language was written after the
contents of The Red Book were composed but before it was published. The Red Book begins with
a conversation between the spirit of the times (the conscious), the spirit of the depths (the
unconscious) and Jung. The spirit of the depths forces Jung to talk to his soul which is depicted
as an archetype, “a living and self-existing being” of Jung’s unconscious (Jung, The Red Book
129). This dialogue with his soul takes him down to hell: “hellish webs of words…you are the
first who gets snared in [words]…with words you pull up the underworld” (351). Yet, words are
also the “saving symbol,” because they bring opposites together: “in words the emptiness and the
fullness flow together,” “sense and nonsense…produces the supreme meaning” (392, 351, 120).
Similarly, as described in Desire in Language, a sort of dialogue occurs between the unconscious
(the mother; rhythm; instincts; desire) and the conscious (the law of the father; culture; the
signified structure of language, grammar). If the individual is able to bring together these
seemingly disparate components, “a poetic language” which is “one and other” would be created
wherein the “pursuit of truth in language” could be striven after (Kristeva, Desire in Language
24, 69). For both Jung and Kristeva, language is the problem, but it is also the solution whereby
opposites are brought together in dialogue so that the individual can come to know and be their
self.
Additionally, madness is recognized by both Jung and Kristeva as being a component of
language and discourse. The spirit of the time calls Jung’s words madness, but the spirit of the
depth recognizes the so-called madness as a state of being, of simply being, which is connected
to laughter as worship, a type of invocation (Jung, The Red Book 122). Similarly, Kristeva
theorizes about carnival, carnivalesque discourse which is free of censorship in the form of
grammar and fixed meanings and is a protest to social norms (Kristeva, Desire in Language 78).
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Madness and carnival are signs that the individual is coming to know their self, according to
Jung’s and Kristeva’s cosmology.
The dialogue that takes place between the parts of the self reflects and is reflected by
dialogue between the individual and others. Jung writes that “the capacity for inner dialogue is a
touchstone of outer objectivity,” for being able to recognize the other in the self (Jung “The
Transcendent Function” 299). Unfortunately, both the individual and society perform poorly at
dialogue. The individual being a microcosm and culture a macrocosm which reflect one another,
both the individual and society suffer from a psychic epidemic, a type of possession, a “loss of
soul,” a split conscious (Jung, The Earth has a Soul 140). The individual is cut off from their
instincts and from various aspects of the unconscious and its archetypes through overidentification with reason and the ego. (181). For the individual, the symptoms are apparent in
the symbols manifest in fantasies and dreams and in psychological maladies (181). As for
society, the symptoms of “wars…social upheavals…conquests… religions” stand as symbols of
the cultural epidemic of the split psyche (188). The solution for these maladies exists at the
individual level through individuation. For Jung, the individual has become fragmented as a
result of consciousness but can achieve wholeness – a tenuous, constantly shifting wholeness –
through integration of the parts of the psyche. After doing so, the individual is no longer a victim
of their own psyche and society but molds self and society to their will (Jung, On the Nature of
the Psyche 40).
Discourse in Williams’ Works
Williams, similarly, emphasizes the power of language and its ability to build
connections within the psyche. He writes, “We are defined by our ability to resonate and shape
sounds. Word.” (Williams, The Dead Emcee Scrolls 171). He cites slang “‘word,’ ‘word up,’

42

‘word life,’ ‘word is bond’” as being evident of the subconscious knowledge of the power of
language (171). Sound vibrations, such as is emphasized in mantras, and not just the meaning of
words are central to the effectiveness of words (171). Music, similar to Jung’s use of painting
and other methods to raise the unconscious and expand the conscious, is perhaps among the most
effective forms of language. Williams observes that people move their heads to music as if
saying yes, as if they were in dialogue with another. Music not only taps directly into the heart
but also “appeal[s] to other aspects of the emotional core,” presumably even the often positive
emotional response which occurs during rationalization (xi). Then, music appeals to both the
conscious and the unconscious. Consciously, the individual could engage the meaning of the
lyrics or the aesthetics of the rhythm. Unconsciously, “Music speaks directly to the
subconscious” (xii). Williams says, “To program a drumbeat is to align an external rhythmic
device to an individual’s biorhythm” (xii). Arguably, the individual’s biorhythm aligns with the
instincts. Break-beats are said to be “the missing link connecting the diasporic community to its
drum-woven past” (101). Spoken word and hip-hop has an ancient ancestry, such as from the
African griot or storyteller, and, as such, is “a return to ancient rites…an ancient tradition” (108).
Music has the potential to reconnect the individual with their instincts and unconscious,
disconnection from the unconscious being the primary malady of humanity according to Jung.
Though not stated as such, Williams’ writing indicates that music, whether in the form of spoken
word or hip-hop or any other form of expression, can be a means of individuation.
Williams’ experience with individuation is similar to Jung’s. In the Dead Emcee Scrolls,
Williams, while looking at graffiti in the abandoned subways of New York, finds a spray paint
can which has pieces of paper rolled up with unintelligible writing. After repeated failure to
interpret the text, Williams begins copying the text in a journal while keeping his eyes on the
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scrolls. Surreally, the text is rendered interpretable in his own handwriting (xvi-xx). Like with
automatic writing, words are manifested through the workings of the unconscious. After the
contents of the unconscious are made conscious, the contents have to be processed rationally, the
meaning and significance being examined. Williams writes that the scrolls “forced [him] to
decipher [his] own life and purpose” (xxix). He writes that the scrolls changed him (xxix). By
bringing the unconscious into the conscious and utilizing the unconscious and the conscious in
turn, Williams progresses along the path of individuation. The Red Book is similarly constructed.
Jung depicts the contents of his fantasies brought about primarily through active imagination5.
After stating his fantasies, Jung examines them critically, trying to decipher their meaning and
their relevance to his life and society. Through this process, Jung engages in individuation. Both
Williams’ and Jung’s works consist of coaxing the unconscious to surface and then critically
engaging the subconscious content in order to integrate it into the conscious. In this way,
Williams’ description of self-realization and self-actualization and Jung’s method of
individuation are strikingly coherent. Both act as a means of finding meaning.
What distinguishes Williams from Jung is the degree to which they elaborated on their
experiences and theories. The difference is that Jung took his experiences with The Red Book and
went on to write other works which delineated his method. It is worthy of note though that after
publishing The Dead Emcee Scrolls Williams has composed other works; for instance, in US(a)
and the album Martyr Loser King Williams attempts to convey theories that he had previously
formulated from a different perspective. Still, it is not systematized enough to be as useful as one
would desire. Williams’ choice of format for his latest works may just be preference, but it can
also be taken as an indication that he is still working at refining his theories. Jung writes that it
took him forty-five years to render his experiences into a scientific language, to find a suitable
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language to convey the process of individuation (Jung qtd. in Shamdasani, “Introduction” 88).
Perhaps Williams will eventually do the same.
Words, Discourse, and Loss of Meaning in White Teeth
The nature of words is directly addressed in White Teeth, and a loss of meaning is
evident. White Teeth cites dictionary definitions multiple times. The final section of the book has
the definitions of fundamental and fundamentalism as an epigraph. Fundamental is defined as “1.
Of or pertaining to the basis or groundwork; going to the root of the matter. 2. Serving as the
base or foundation; essential or indispensable. Also, primary, original; from which others are
derived….4. Of a stratum: lowest, lying at the bottom. (OED qtd. in Smith, White Teeth 341).
Fundamentalism is defined as “The strict maintenance of traditional orthodox religious beliefs or
doctrines; esp. in the inerrancy of religious texts” (OED qtd. in Smith, White Teeth 341). Though
given a dictionary definition, the meanings of both terms are not so simplistic. Fundamental in
White Teeth is, consistent with the dictionary definition, associated with origin and roots, but no
one can figure out what the origin is or whether or not roots are sustaining or caustic.
Fundamental loses its meaning. The association of words are even tricky. Fundamentalism is not
necessarily fundamental, as is indicated by the dictionary definitions. Though fundamentalism
originally referred to adherence to scripture, it is now used as a slur – used at worst against
whole demographics and at its most innocuous against those who spread extremism and commit
violence – and is often used against those who are mentally and spiritually expansive and
peaceful when compared to those who sling the term. Also worthy of note, though
fundamentalism is most often applied as a slur to Islam in White Teeth and in current affairs, it
was originally coined and referred genially to Protestant Christians (OED). In White Teeth, the
term is used even more broadly to refer to Jehovah’s Witnesses, scientists, animal rights
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activists, and even by cultural groups (Islam) against members of their own subgroups (KEVIN).
Fundamentalism does not seem to have a coherent meaning any more. By extension, being
labeled a fundamentalist loses its meaning as well.
Loss of meaning is addressed by Jung and Kristeva as well but in a different sense. In The
Red Book, Jung describes how the unconscious is a state that contemporary society would view
as madness – the place where sense and nonsense merge – which temporarily takes away the
individual’s ability to dialogue as part of a renewal, “which produces the supreme meaning.”
(120, 122). Similarly, Kristeva talks of a “loss of meaning” that results from jouissance,
jouissance being associated with both the unconscious drives, which is to be avoided since the
individual may lose themselves to it, and the bringing of the unconscious into awareness, the
goal of which is to “know itself, to communicate” and as a result “loses itself” (Kristeva, Desire
in Language 163). Certainly, whether it is Jung’s individuation or Kristeva’s jouissance, the
process is perilous, a means by which meaning can be lost and/or gained.
Jung’s and Kristeva’s loss of meaning (the result of coming to know and bringing
together different parts of one’s own psyche, the mad disorientation that results from a new
perspective) is different than the loss of meaning (the failure to see different perspectives)
experienced by the characters of White Teeth which results from over identification with the ego
which is based on the superstructure, whether it be the dominant culture or a subculture, rather
than on knowledge of the psyche as a whole (Kristeva, Desire in Language 163). The loss of
meaning experienced by the characters in White Teeth is, rather, “pathologizing by discourse”
known as othering, as discussed in “Othering, Identity Formation and Agency” by Sune Jensen,
through associating the individual, particularly those from minority groups with crime and
aggression (63).
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This distortion of discourse and othering is indicated by the characters’ relationship with
words and texts. It is said of Marcus Chalfen that if he were confronted with the idea that “truth
is a function of language” that Marcus would dismiss the individual confronting him with the
idea as weird or as fools and fundamentalists who should not be suffered (Smith, White Teeth
26). Millat Iqbal does not even try to read his holy scriptures, the Koran, because he believes that
intellectualism is beyond him; yet, despite not knowing what his holy scriptures say and being
truly unaware of the tenets and morality that it speaks of, Millat calls all others fundamentalists
(367). Hortense Bowden is told that she must not interpret the Bible and that her intuition is
invalid, the privilege of which is reserved for the anointed of the Jehovah’s Witnesses, who are
all men (321, 319). Though not using the term fundamentalism, Hortense labels others wicked
without any solid foundation to do so (404). The loss of meaning experienced by the characters
of White Teeth, rather than being a result of awareness of and integration of the unconscious,
seems to be the result of mindless over identification with the superstructure, the loss of
individuality which results in projection, seeing their own extremism and violence in others
rather than in themselves. In this way, everyone other than the characters themselves and those
likeminded with the characters are deemed guilty of fundamentalism. The meaning of the word
is lost. All of these characters engage in pathologizing by discourse, othering.
Case Studies of Stilted Individuation, Progression, and Regression
The Chalfens serve as examples of over identification with the ego and the pathologizing
of discourse whereby they use language as a tool to domineer, which is recognized as a form of
projection. Their lack of awareness indicates that they have not engaged in re-vision nor rerepresentation. Samad has a degree of awareness and vacillates between integrating and
repressing the unconscious and the drives. However, his awareness surfaces in brief stints and his
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repression leads to the unconscious welling up to possess him. Though Samad has a modicum of
awareness, he fails to re-vision his self and society and does not engage in re-representation.
Millat actively struggles with his identity and seems to be on the verge of re-visioning and rerepresentation. However, his dogmatic adherence to fate and identity created for him by others
(as opposed to an engagement in myth making and self-realization) stunts his progression and
leaves him tentatively regressed. Millat strives towards re-vision and re-representation but,
instead, enacts a painful charade.
The Chalfens: A Poverty of Self-Realization and Wealth of Narcissism
As a more in depth look at the failure to go through the process of self-realization and
individuation and the distortion of discourse, I present the Chalfens as an example. The
Chalfens’ failure at individuation is evident from their narcissism and over-identification with
the superstructure. Kristeva says that the first step in transformation is the dissolving of
narcissism and, narcissism being anchored in the ego, of the ego (162). Their failure to go
through the process of individuation also shows in their use of language, which they wield to
dominate others rather than to explore their own identity. Joyce’s and Marcus’s pathologizing by
discourse is a form of projection, the act of placing one’s emotions and complexes onto another.
The Chalfens lack awareness and have not engaged in re-vision, let alone re-representation.
In the chapter titled “Canines: The Ripping Teeth” in White Teeth, the reader first
encounters the Chalfens and their harmful use of language and discourse, and a loss of meaning
is evident as concerns their labels for their selves. The chapter is well titled; Joyce and Marcus
Chalfen’s beliefs and actions have a rending effect, “congeniall[ly]” tearing at other characters’
roots and identities (260). The “Chalfen way,” which has been employed for generations,
includes dismissing the fools, fools being anyone who is religious (those who value spirituality),
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environmental/animal rights activists (those who empathize with nature and animals), or “anyone
who failed to grasp the simple fact that social and scientific progress were brothers-in-arms”
(those who do not value science above all else) i.e., anyone who is not like the Chalfens
themselves (260). Also indicative of “Chalfenism,” the Chalfens overtly stereotype others more
than any other characters in White Teeth (262). Yet, as it turns out, Joyce and Marcus’s son
defies the Chalfen norm and becomes an animal rights activist, going against the Chalfen’s own
stereotype of themselves. There appears to be no true Chalfen way, much like there is not a
coherent meaning for fundamental and fundamentalism. As discussed above, this loss of
meaning is tied up with the Chalfen’s failure to know their selves, narcissistic over-identification
with the ego staunchly based on the mores of the superstructure rather than knowledge of their
own psyche (Kristeva, Desire in Language 63). The Chalfens are neither aware of the oppressive
nature of the superstructure nor their own alienation from their own selves.
Among the Chalfens, Joyce provides some of the most poignant example of estrangement
from the self. Joyce’s self-perception and self-definition is narcissistically skewed. In her book
The New Flower, Joyce describes herself as a “lapsed-Catholic horticulturalist feminist” before
she goes on to use gardening as a metaphor for relationships (Smith, White Teeth 258). Joyce’s
perception of herself is not accurate. For instance, though she claims to be a feminist, Joyce is
confounded by Neena’s homosexuality, wondering “Who pollinates and who nurtures” (289).
Joyce is unable to see women as anything but nurturers. Further proof that Joyce is out of touch
with her nature is the narrator’s assertion that “Truth was truth to the Chalfens” (26). Nature, the
collective conscious of the unconscious, is “beyond truth and error,” such binaries being the
domain of the ego (Jung, The Earth has a Soul 82). Still, nature/the unconscious can only be
ignored and/or repressed for so long before it either results in awareness or projection (94). As
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indicated by the examples just given, Joyce’s primary identity is that of nurturer, though her
nurturing is actually caustic to others (pathologizing by discourse) and to herself (cultivation of
the conscious will to the detriment of her nature).
The Chalfens’ anthropocentrism demonstrates their estrangement from their own
nature/self and provides a foundation for their othering and reinforcing the mores of capitalism.
Marcus attempts to rule nature through the Oncomouse, a mouse whose genes have been
manipulated so that its health and life span are predetermined. Joyce declares to herself: “for
illness was to Marcus, nothing more than bad logic on the part of the genome” (26). Both Joyce
and Marcus believe that they can consistently have power over nature. This narcissism renders
both Joyce and Marcus unable to empathize, unable to see the subjectivity of other beings, the
self in the other. One of the most striking instances of othering is Marcus’s relationship with the
mouse. He ponders:
To determine a mouse’s future stirred people up. Precisely because people saw it that
way: it wasn’t determining the future of a cancer, or a reproductive cycle, or the capacity
to age. It was determining the future of the mouse. People focused on the mouse in a
manner that never failed to surprise him. They seemed unable to think of the animal as a
site, a biological site for experimentation into heredity, into disease, into morality. The
mousiness of the mouse seemed inescapable. (146)
That is, the mousiness of the mouse, its inherent value as a subject, is inescapable to others but
not to Marcus. Marcus brushes the experience of the mouse aside with the statement that it’s
natural, that “all animals are in a sense programmed to die” (147). Though Marcus speaks the
truth, he refuses to take into account that suffering is not eased just because death is fate. He is
unable or unwilling to empathize. Because of this, he is able to misidentify the nature of the
mouse and to justify dominion over it. The mouse is other and a commodity in a capitalistic
society.
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Joyce also engages in some of White Teeth’s most memorable pathologizing by
discourse. A form of “pathologizing by discourse” (Jensen 63), using language as a form of
slander in the guise of nurturing, Joyce attempts to nurture Magid by diagnosing him with
ADHD. She misreads what she perceives as “just so many signs” as a result of her begrudging
her husband’s and Magid’s affinity for one another (Smith, White Teeth 360). Carelessly using
psychoanalysis, Joyce takes her analyst’s diagnosis of Millat out of context and embellishes it
(“Millat’s inner life – his karma, I suppose you might call it in Bengali – the whole world of his
subconscious shows serious illness”6) as a means of attacking Alsana Iqbal, Millat’s mother
(366). Joyce’s error is that she is always trying to nurture others but never cultivates her self
(261). When she does cultivate, it is through projection rather than actually appreciating the
individuality of others.
It should also be noted that the Chalfens engage in projection as a result of their failure to
connect with their selfs and others. The Chalfens deny their unconscious and its effect on them.
As a result, he projects: “all others were fanatics” (Smith, White Teeth 353). It could also be
considered a form of possession which results from repressing the unconscious. Jung writes,
[Modern man] is blind to the fact that, with all his rationality and efficiency, he is
possessed by powers beyond his control. The gods and demons have not disappeared at
all, they have merely got new names. They keep him on the run with restlessness, vague
apprehensions, psychological complications, an invincible need for pills, alcohol,
tobacco, dietary and other hygienic systems – and above, all, with an impressive array of
neuroses…alarming degree of dissociation and psychological confusion. We believe
exclusively in consciousness and free will, and are no longer aware of the powers that
control us to an indefinite degree, outside the narrow domain where we can be reasonable
and exercise a certain amount of free choice and self-control. (Jung, The Earth has a Soul
127)
The Chalfens are driven towards Chalfenism and science as another person would be driven
towards some of the vices listed above. Contrary to what they think, Joyce and Marcus do not
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have control over their selfs, their freedom being unknowingly arrested. They have lost their
roots and so have lost their selfs.
Joyce and Marcus Chalfen use language to dominate others instead of as a means towards
individuation. They have not made it past their own narcissism. Consequently, they have not
been able to progress through the first step of self-realization/individuation. They are unaware of
the damages wrought by their own disconnection to their selfs and others and by capitalism.
They are a voice for the mores of capitalism and so have failed at re-representation.
Samad Iqbal: Towards Self-realization and regression to the Superego
Samad makes it to the second step of self-realization, as outlined by Kristeva. The
individual loses faith in the superstructure, the ego begins to break apart, and the “instinctual
drive” surfaces (Kristeva, Desire in Language 162). Then, “an aimless drifting ensues” and “an
infinite abyss where there are no more words” (162-63). At this phase, the individual appears
fragmented, but the individual is actually encountering jouissance, a jouissance which the
individual must flee lest they be consumed by it (163). Arguably, Samad is experiencing this
phase. However, by embracing the superstructure as a means to battle the anxiety caused by
individuation, Samad is taking a step backwards into narcissism and ego inflation. Samad
vacillates between and other times simultaneously experiences being controlled by his instincts
and reinforcing the mores of the superstructure onto his self. Samad moves between partial
awareness and unawareness, between brief stints of integrating the parts of the psyche and losing
awareness of his self to domination of the conscious and subsequent domination by the
unconscious. Samad does not adequately engage in re-vision and is unable to engage in rerepresentation.
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Samad seeks connection with the self and others through connection with his roots, which
he detrimentally conflates with culture rather than his self or his instincts. Jung considers roots to
be related to “age-old convictions and customs” and the instincts (Jung, The Earth has a Soul,
73). However, Samad errs in considering roots to be tradition and culture, particularly Islam, the
law of the father (Smith, White Teeth 161). Islam, at least Samad’s Islam, represses the instincts.
As such, it is merely a subculture within the dominant culture, just another version of the law of
the father which really represses the roots rather than getting back to them. Samad would have to
go back farther in history to find a spirituality aligned with the instincts, past Islam, past
Hinduism, perhaps to an earth religion or a self-defined gnostic form of Islam or Hinduism.
While Samad does not err in inflating the importance of rationality, he does esteem the
will (the conscious and the ego) over the drives (the unconscious); yet, Samad is unable to free
himself from his drives, and his self is further unbalanced towards the conscious. Rationality
being to him the “most overrated Western virtue,” Samad compulsively pursues religion and
faith (Smith, White Teeth 196). In the cosmology of Islam, according to Samad’s understanding,
humans are weak and lack control. He explains that Islam means “I surrender” to God to the
point of giving over one’s will and life (Smith, White Teeth 240). Yet, despite this turning over
of one’s will to God, Samad’s ascetic version of Islam requires significant exertion of the will to
curve his drives. In this sense, Samad’s religion cultivates the conscious and suppresses the
unconscious. Despite denigrating rationality, Samad also seems to practice an “intellectual faith”
(348). Samad does not actually surrender his will to God. Rather, he exerts his will on behalf of
his God. The narrator explains that Samad’s desperately adhering to Islam is a result of being
“pulled down to the depths” by his lust (161). Samad losing himself to his lust coincides with the
statement above that the instincts well up and that the individual is threatened by being lost in

53

jouissance. Samad’s experience is also in keeping with Kristeva’s assertion that when men try to
distance themselves from the law of the father, Western culture and rationality in this case, that
their superego “perpetuate[s] itself as trace through a symbolic ascesis renouncing sexual
jouissance” (Kristeva, Desire in Language 154). In other words, Samad’s conscious resistance of
culture, Western culture, pulls him all the more strongly into the culture of the superego, Islamic
culture in Samad’s case, which is manifested in a self-discipline that only serves to alienate him
more from his drives and so casts him further under the influence of culture, the law of the
father. Samad resists both culture and his drives, not enough to be free from either, just enough
to be alienated from his self.
Still, there is a limit to which the conscious can repress the unconscious; if repressed for
too long, the unconscious will deluge the conscious, and possession will occur. The narrator of
White Teeth remarks that, despite Samad’s glorification of tradition and Islam, “that didn’t mean
he could live by them, abide by them, or grow in the manner they demanded” (161). Samad finds
himself “at a moral crossroads” (121). He vacillates between awareness and repression. Samad,
early on, sees himself as the stupid, morphine addict which he became during the war and longs
for the “erudite, handsome, light skinned Samad Miah” that he once was (94). Yet, this
awareness never lasts long. Samad quickly represses these realizations by means of religion. As a
result of over-identification with the ego which focuses on institutionalized religion, Samad
begins to project his other traits out. As a result of being detached from his roots, of being
“exiled from [his] own soul,” Samad attempts to “conquer other lands” in the form of his sons’
futures (Jung, The Earth has a Soul 73). He projects his own shortcomings and hopes for himself
upon his sons. Samad becomes “a father under protest” (Kristeva, Desire in Language 151); he
reinforces the culture, rationality included, which has repressed him. Samad has lost his self to
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the point even of possession. Samad speaks “against his will, for something more bestial than his
will was now doing the talking” (Smith, White Teeth 112). Jung explains that when the instincts
“get lost, the conscious mind becomes severed from the instincts and loses its roots, while the
instincts, unable to express themselves, fall back into the unconscious and reinforce its energy,
causing this in turn to overflow into the existing contents of consciousness.” (Jung, The Earth
has a Soul 73). Samad has lost touch with his roots to the point that they possess him. He lives in
the law of the father while the archetypes of the unconscious possess him.
Samad is left with self-hatred, an identity that rends him and, as a coping technique,
forces him to overidentify with the superego (Smith, White Teeth 94). As discussed above,
Kristeva explains that the first step in the transformation of the individual towards the inclusion
of the unconscious is the dissolving of narcissism. Samad has seen the ugly and stupid aspects of
himself and so has made it to the first step of self-realization. However, Kristeva says that “the
body seems to need an identity” (163). As a result, rigidity or decay of identity and one’s relation
with the instincts occurs. The individual may move forward in integrating the unconscious or
may further identify with the superego. Samad seems to over-identify with the superego when
his ego fails him and, consequently, his individuation is stilted. He does not manage to re-vision
his self and society and does not engage in re-representation.
Millat Iqbal: Another Case of Progression and Regression
Millat is suck in the second stage of self-realization as well. He is caught between times,
being neither modern nor getting back to his roots. He is between cultures, being neither wholly
Western/scientific nor Eastern/Islamic. He exists between states of being, being neither rational
nor driven by faith or instincts. He gropes for a place to fit in, experimenting with voice and
identity. Millat tends to wear his identity derived from these different times, cultures, and states
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of being as a mask, rather than identifying it as his self. Still, Millat does not rework these
cultural identities in order to form his own unique identity; rather, he wears his prefabricated
masks in turn as suits his purpose. One would think that Millat would excel at re-vision, since he
is able to balance and merge identities; however, his skill at working vying subjectivities does
not equate to an ability to engage in self-realization or individuation. At first, Millat seems as if
he will become aware and vocal. In the end, Millat does not engage in re-vision or rerepresentation.
Early on, Millat questions dialect and the culture associated with it. He rhetorically
questions, “What’s wrong with ‘a’ encyclopedia?...Why’s everyone in this house always puttin’
on fuckin’ airs?” (Smith, White Teeth 200). He rejects the normative and experiments with
dialect: “What they want…is to stop pissing around wid dis hammer business and jus’ get some
Semtex and blow de djam ting [the Berlin Wall] up, if they don’t like it, you get me?” (198).
Millat rebels in an almost militant manner against division, division by literal walls, division by
culture, division of the self. Millat’s newfound voice is quickly dismissed by Irie, Millat’s peer
who is putting on a proletariat voice and trying to force others to do the same, as not being his
own voice7. Millat continues to try to re-vision himself but is continually met with social
castigation because of it7.
Being unable to form his own identity due to the pressures of society, Millat takes on the
identity of multiple subcultures. He becomes the sign of the subcultures. Kristeva writes that the
sign is dyadic (Kristeva, Desire in Language 41). The sign resembles that to which it refers, but
it also contains within itself its opposite. This dyadic principle is fundamental to dialect (i.e., the
signs in the novel, Kristeva’s chosen focus for language in Desire in Language, containing
within itself the synthesizing of contradiction) and to the individual (i.e., the writer as both actor
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when writing and author as the producer of the finished work) (41). Millat could use this dyadic
principle to write his own identity, choosing from the various signs who he wants to be and
creating an amalgam that is to be his own identity. Instead, he takes up identities already written
for him, merely alternating them instead of molding them to his own purpose. He becomes an
actor in other people’s scripts instead of creating his own and so does not engage in re-vision.
Millat is aware of his voicelessness and of his failure to form his own identity, but he
does not solve the dilemma constructively, projecting instead of utilizing introspection. He is not
only the commonplace daredevil, drug user, etc. of the various subcultures to which he belongs;
he is also labeled as an unwanted Eastern immigrant bum (Smith, White Teeth 194). He becomes
angry at having neither “face [nor] voice” within society (194). Instead of forming his own
identity and voice, he projects when being projected upon. To a racial slur, Millat responds,
“First: I’m not a Paki, you ignorant fuck. And second: you don’t need a translator, yeah? I’ll give
it to you straight. You’re a fucking faggot, yeah? Queer boy, poofter, batty-rider, shit-dick”
(192). He is denigrated so he denigrates others, not only verbally abusing the racial slur using
merchant but also another minority. Another solution to the projection of others, Millat puts on
the image of trouble, the uniform for trouble including Nike and its “mark of corporate approval”
(193). Thus, Millat’s identity is clearly not a self-made identity. Finally, finding others who are
angry and voiceless like himself, Millat joins KEVIN. Certainly, Millat is now a part of an
organization that has a voice, but it is not his voice. Millat dogmatically implements KEVIN’s
dictates, denying the West with its monomaniacal pursuit of free-will and what he considers the
irrational faith of his father for the rational tenets of the fundamentalist Islamic organization
KEVIN (368). However, Millat is still pursuing a similar path to his father and of modern man,
consciously repressing his desires instead of coming to know his unconscious and projecting.
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Being submersed in the dictates of KEVIN, Millat comes closest to losing his self to his ego and
the superego. Yet, Millat uses KEVIN as a means of securing a social position and of exerting a
voice not his own, unlike his father who is subject rather than wielder of his religion. While it
may appear that Millat is engaging in re-representation, he is merely representing the tenets of a
subculture which alienates him from his self and others.
In the end, Millat becomes his fate, which is equivalent to saying that he loses hope in revisioning and re-representing his self. He decides to pursue his destiny. Millat thinks to himself:
Because there aren’t any alien objects or events anymore, just as there aren’t any sacred
ones. It’s all so familiar. It’s all on TV. So handling the cold metal, feeling it next to his
skin that first time: it was easy. And when things come to you easily, when things click
effortlessly into place, it is so tempting to use the four-letter F-word. Fate. Which to
Millat is a quantity very much like TV: an unstoppable narrative, written, produced and
directed by somebody else. (436)
Millat does not try to exert his will on his own behalf. He is not motivated by science nor God
like the others. He acts because he feels as if he has no other choice, so he embraces it. Fate,
according to Jung, is linked with both the supra-conscious and the unconscious. It must be
understood that the supra-conscious, conscious, and unconscious, if plotted as a diagram, would
not be linear but would be circular with the supra-conscious and the unconscious running into
one another with no clear distinguishing line. The supra-conscious is unconscious in that it is
beyond normal consciousness (Jung, The Earth has a Soul 81). The symbols contained within the
supra-consciousness “anticipates future conscious processes” (81). The fate that is alluded to by
Jung still acknowledges the role of the conscious and the will. The fate of the supra-conscious is
not destiny. The unconscious, on the other hand, is “a largely autonomous psychic system
containing autonomous archetypes” (80). Since Millat feels himself subject to fate, it is likely
that Millat is experiencing the influence of his unconscious archetypes. Since archetypes can be
autonomous, it is arguable that Millat experiences a type of possession by the archetypes8.
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The influence of the archetypes over Millat is questionable. The archetypes, which are
“inherited with the brain structure,” are systems of readiness for action, and at the same time
images and emotions (Jung, The Earth has a Soul 189). They are “the roots which the psyche has
sunk…in the world” (189). The archetypes, in this way, are vital to individual wellbeing. In
modern society, possession by the archetypes, experienced as “loss of soul,” does not result from
giving oneself over to them but from denying them (140). The archetypes cannot be done away
with by bringing them to consciousness. Repressing the archetypes builds up energy in the
unconscious which eventually spills out in “symbolic happenings” which is effectively the voice
of the unconscious (86). Rather, the archetypes have to be integrated into the individual’s
identity of self (140). The question is, then, to what extent has Millat merely repressed the
archetypes and to what extent has he integrated them. Considering that Millat compares his
experience of life to a TV show, “an unstoppable narrative, written, produced and directed by
somebody else,” it seems that Millat’s archetypes have possessed him (Smith, White Teeth 436).
Millat’s archetypes have not been integrated into his conscious but dictate his fate. It seems that
Millat has failed at re-vision.
Still, it could be argued that Millat merely feels controlled externally. The possibility that
Millat is being controlled externally is and is not true in a sense. He is controlled by outside
influences, but only because of psychological poverty. Millat goes on to explain that, though life
seems like TV, he realizes that it is not the same. Life has consequences. Whether it is Millat or
the narrative who goes on to explain is unclear. It is explained that “even to think this is to look
to the movies for reference” (Smith, White Teeth 436). Millat has not had the experience of war
to live through unlike his father and his ancestors, so he has no “analogies or anecdotes” to refer
to (436). Instead, he refers to movies, The Godfather in particular. Over and over, Millat has
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rewound and played it in slow motion and recalls that it does not matter how much the characters
doubt their actions because they still fulfill their fate (436). In contrast, myths, a common
expression of archetypes, change over the years9. Millat has no such myths, no evolving
archetypes, to follow. He only has a movie which unerringly transmits the cultural values of one
particular time. Millat is not on a path of individuation. He does not claim the myths of society
and make them his own, rewriting them to suit his perspectives and needs. Rewriting such myths
could have been a path towards self-realization, re-visioning, and re-representation, but, instead,
he follows cultural models dogmatically.
Still, the reader is left questioning how much of Millat’s experiences are based on his
acceptance of culture and how much his experiences are based on the autonomous actions of the
archetypes. There is no definite answer. What is clear is that Millat has not successfully gone
through the process of individuation, has not developed his own identity or voice, and has not
engaged in re-visioning and re-representation.
Since the path towards self-realization and re-visioning, there still might be hope in the
characters enacting re-visioning and re-representation. Individuation is not linear, being the
“circumambulation of the self” (Jung qtd. in Shamdasani, “Introduction” 80). Regression may
follow progression. Regression is not harmful as long as it does not continue one-sidedly. The
Chalfens practically never begin the process of individuation, over-identifying with their own
ego and the superstructure. Samad progresses but then regresses as a maladapted coping
mechanism. Millat is stuck in a middle stage of individuation. Since individuation is not linear,
certain characters in White Teeth who seem to be regressing, Millat particularly, may actually
still be on the path towards individuation, considering that the story is left unfinished.
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Symbol Formation and Myth Making
To reiterate, individuation is self-realization which occurs through dialogue with the
unconscious. Jung describes the process as follows: “To do this he must first return to the
fundamental facts of his own being, irrespective of all authority and tradition, and allow himself
to become conscious of his distinctiveness” (Jung, On the Nature of the Psyche 59). In order for
individuation to occur, the individual needs to disconnect from “mass symbols, i.e. –isms” (48).
The mass symbols that the individual must disconnect from include philosophies such as
empiricism and Marxism but also religious philosophies such as Islam. Instead, the individual
needs to engage in their own symbol formation.
Kristeva’s final stage of self-realization occurs when the ego is torn apart and when “‘I’
continually makes itself over again, posits itself as a displaced symbolic witness of the shattering
where every entity was dissolved” (164). This stage goes on indefinitely with the individual
constantly revisioning their self. New symbols have to be created. New cultural myths have to be
created that is congruent with the new “I.”
These new symbols and myths can be new creations but can also be works of revisioning. An example of re-visioning symbols can be found in Williams’ reimagining and
repurposing of the word loser. Though the Chalfens nor Samad nor Millat engage in symbol or
myth formation10, others have. Others have moved past the void of fragmentation, past the anger,
past the despair, to a point of self-creation simultaneously painful and joyous in itself and
cathartic to others.
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Notes
1. The term “talking cure” was first used by Anna O. (Schultz & Schultz 298). She used
the term to refer to her conversations with her doctor; these conversations under hypnosis
temporarily resulted in the relief of her symptoms. Anna O. was a patient of Josef Breuer, an
acquaintance of Sigmund Freud. Freud used the case of Anna O. as a foundation for
psychoanalysis.
2. Applied psychoanalytic theories will not be referred to in this work. Certainly. the
Neo-Freudian psychoanalysts and the Neo-Neo-Freudian psychoanalysts – e.g., Anna Freud’s
ego psychology, Melanie Klein’s object relations theories, Alfred Adler’s individual psychology,
etc. – are of note. Yet, they are not within the scope of this paper.
3. Jung, if he were psychoanalyzing Lacan, would likely argue that Lacan suffers from an
imbalance, being lost in “a hubris of the conscious mind” as a result of being cut off from his
unconscious, both instinct and the archetypes (Jung, The Earth has a Soul 73). Lacan describes
Jung’s process of psychoanalysis “as a rite of passage to some archetypal, or in any sense
ineffable, experience” (Lacan, Ecrits 674). Jung admits himself that there is not a “reliable
method of interpretation” (Jung, The Earth has a Soul 189). However, that by no means
translates to it being impossible to understand the symbols generated by the individual. Rather,
the analyst must draw from knowledge of the archetypes, the analysand’s experiences and
relation to the symbols or sequence of symbols, and the analyst’s own understanding and
experiences. Jung states, “Anyone who wishes to interpret a dream must himself be on
approximately the same level as the dream for nowhere can he see anything more than what he is
himself” (191). It seems, then, that Lacan’s dismissal of Jung’s theories is due to his failure to go
through the process of individuation himself. Lacan’s overidentification with the conscious self
explains Lacan’s view of the individual as essentially fragmented.
4. Jung’s and Kristeva’s theories are similar in that they both focus on uniting opposites
and the divergent parts of the psyche. However, Kristeva seeks to distance herself from Jung.
Kristeva mentions, “Jung’s dead end with its archetypal configuration of libidinal substance
taken out of the realm of sexuality and placed in bondage to the archaic mother” (Kristeva,
Desire in Language 276). It is worthy of note that Jung’s theories are not divorced from
sexuality. He talks about the drives rooted in the unconscious and even the tantric as experienced
by elevated consciousness. Most importantly though, Kristeva dismisses the archetypes as a part
of the psyche. She does not give a sufficient reason for dismissing the archetypes. Arguing that
Kristeva has not gone through the process of individuation and so fails to understand the
significance of the archetypes does not completely hold up. Jung’s and Kristeva’s experiences
were similar. Kristeva, like Jung, even asserts that “no scholar, no orthodox theoretician can find
his way through any of my essays unless he has personally experienced” the final step of selfrealization where the “I” is continually dissolved and reformed (164). There does not seem to be
any solid foundation for either dismissing Jung’s archetypes or for rejecting Kristeva’s dismissal
of archetypes. As such, Jung’s theories relating to the archetypes will be retained as valid in this
paper. Besides Kristeva’s emphasis on spoken and written words rather than symbols as a whole
and her exclusion of the archetypes, Jung’s and her theories are congruent, and, as such,
Kristeva’s theories will also be referred to regularly.
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5. Active imagination includes anything that suppresses the conscious, clearing the mind
so that unconscious content can surface (Jung, The Transcendent Function 284). Active
imagination techniques can include anything from doing Buddhist meditations to practicing
alchemy (Shamdasani, “Introduction” 89).
6. Actually, in the next paragraph that follows, it is explained that Millat knows that his
subconscious is split; it is split between what culture desires of him (asceticism, intellectualism,
Eastern morals, Western mindset) and what he is naturally inclined to (the oversexed, violent,
decadent life of a gangster). Joyce is part of Millat’s problem, pressuring him to be other than
what he is.
7. Granted, not everyone is repressing Millat’s voice. Clara defends Millat in a timid
manner saying that she does not think that they should squelch the children’s opinions (Smith,
White Teeth 200). It is too late though; Millat has already consigned himself to his room.
8. How much the archetypes control Millat’s fate is questionable. Jung says of the
archetypes that they have “traces of personality,” but do not have an I (Jung, The Archetypes and
the Collective Unconscious 283). If there is no I, then the archetypes are not autonomous.
Elsewhere, Jung writes that “archetypes are, as a rule, autonomous entities” who reside at least
partially outside of the individual’s will (Jung, The Earth has a Soul 140). Archetypes can be
autonomous to the extent that they can act as “dominants” (140). The archetypes are capable of
controlling the individual, because the archetypes have “a consciousness in itself” (172). Since
publishing The Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious, Jung refined his theories. The quotes
stating that archetypes are autonomous come from his later works and are, as such, more
trustworthy.
9. For instance, the oldest stories about Lilith depict her as having a dual nature, a savage
destroyer but also a divine mother as well as a holy seductress, evil and holy, destroyer and
creator. According to Siegmund Hurwitz in Lilith, the First Eve: Historical and
Psychological Aspects of the Dark Feminine, the Priestly Codex, the best-known Lilith myth,
is heavily influenced by patriarchy; Lilith is demonized for refusing to be submissive (Hurwitz,
Lilith 120). Today, though the Priestly Codex version of Lilith prevails, she is increasingly being
seen as a figure of reverence, a strong-willed female figure. From a psychoanalytic perspective,
the myth is going through the same evolution as humanity, through the path of individuation. In
the beginning, all aspects are recognized in Lilith; opposites are united. Then, with the advent of
patriarchy, certain aspects are denigrated and repressed. Lilith’s lascivious, rebellious side is
emphasized as an example of what not to be. Finally, those aspects denied to Lilith are being
reintegrated, and her darker aspects are being embraced.
10. Some might argue that the Chalfens do engage in symbol formation rooted around
science. For instance, Joyce says that Marcus is greater than God since he creates creatures that
even Yahweh could not design. However, such a statement has little to do with science and is
primarily the result of Joyce’s delusional narcissism.
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